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ABSTRACT  
   
Resilience is emerging as the preferred way to improve the protection of infrastructure 
systems beyond established risk management practices. Massive damages experienced during 
tragedies like Hurricane Katrina showed that risk analysis is incapable to prevent unforeseen 
infrastructure failures and shifted expert focus towards resilience to absorb and recover from 
adverse events. Recent, exponential growth in research is now producing consensus on how to 
think about infrastructure resilience centered on definitions and models from influential 
organizations like the US National Academy of Sciences. Despite widespread efforts, massive 
infrastructure failures in 2017 demonstrate that resilience is still not working, raising the question: 
Are the ways people think about resilience producing resilient infrastructure systems?  
This dissertation argues that established thinking harbors misconceptions about 
infrastructure systems that diminish attempts to improve their resilience. Widespread efforts 
based on the current canon focus on improving data analytics, establishing resilience goals, 
reducing failure probabilities, and measuring cascading losses. Unfortunately, none of these 
pursuits change the resilience of an infrastructure system, because none of them result in 
knowledge about how data is used, goals are set, or failures occur. Through the examination of 
each misconception, this dissertation results in practical, new approaches for infrastructure 
systems to respond to unforeseen failures via sensing, adapting, and anticipating processes. 
Specifically, infrastructure resilience is improved by sensing when data analytics include the 
modeler-in-the-loop, adapting to stress contexts by switching between multiple resilience 
strategies, and anticipating crisis coordination activities prior to experiencing a failure. 
Overall, results demonstrate that current resilience thinking needs to change because it 
does not differentiate resilience from risk. The majority of research thinks resilience is a property 
that a system has, like a noun, when resilience is really an action a system does, like a verb. 
Treating resilience as a noun only strengthens commitment to risk-based practices that do not 
protect infrastructure from unknown events. Instead, switching to thinking about resilience as a 
verb overcomes prevalent misconceptions about data, goals, systems, and failures, and may 
bring a necessary, radical change to the way infrastructure is protected in the future.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Resilience is emerging as the preferred way for governments and academics to advance 
the protection of infrastructure systems beyond established risk management practices. Risk 
management centers on using risk analysis to identify the potential events that threaten 
infrastructure, the likelihood that threatening events may cause damages, and the resulting 
consequences of these damages to make decisions [1]. Past catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina 
(2005) and Superstorm Sandy (2012) which risk analysis deemed either too unlikely or too costly 
to consider led national and international organizations to reevaluate risk-based approaches for 
managing infrastructure failures. Experts found risk analysis ineffective to guide decisions that 
prevent unknown and unforeseen events, and shifted to endorsing infrastructure resilience to 
withstand surprising losses and quickly recover from catastrophe [2]. Growing efforts to promote 
resilience by government agencies sparked recent, exponential growth in resilience research by 
academic institutions to support lofty goals for a safer future [3]–[5]. Now a steady stream of 
research is promoting resilience-based catastrophe management and searching for ways to 
improve infrastructure protection [4], [6]. 
The vast majority of resilient infrastructure research hinges on few common definitions 
and illustrative models to advance resilience-based design, operations, and management. 
Influential organizations such as the Office of the President of the United States [7], [8], the US 
National Academies of Science (NAS) [9], and the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction [10] all have working definitions of resilience that guide infrastructure 
resilience research and applied practice. Although each uses different terminology, all emphasize 
improving the ways built systems respond to failures, exemplified by the NAS defining resilience 
as, “the ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse events,” [9]. A 
common model found across academic literature, the critical functionality curve (e.g., Fig. 1), 
operationalizes these influential definitions by mapping the loss of services over time like 
electricity, water, mobility, and communications with respect to failures [11]–[15]. The critical 
functionality curve makes the intuitive connection between the services provided by infrastructure 
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systems and pre- and post-failure response practices identified in resilience definitions. In doing 
so it also offers a way to improve infrastructure resilience – flattening the curve, i.e., reducing the 
loss of services and speeding up recovery efforts. Together, a promising way to think about 
resilient infrastructure is emerging that emphasizes improved failure management activities and 
tracking system performance when losses occur. 
Despite established definitions and models guiding research and applied work for the last 
20 years [16], recent massive losses due to infrastructure failures raise the question: are the 
ways people thinking about resilience producing resilient infrastructure systems? The 
widespread adoption of the NAS definition and the critical functionality curve makes it tempting to 
Figure 1 Relationships between National Academy of Sciences Definition of 
Resilience, Infrastructure Function, and Risk. 
Infrastructure systems perform a critical function that is degraded and recovered 
over time after a system experiences a failure. Risk analysis focuses on single 
point on this line, where threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences are combined 
into a single metric. Resilience is often associated to the shaded area between the 
dot-dashed line and the critical functionality curve, where more resilient systems 
have a smaller area. Resilience is gained through planning and preparation, 
absorption, recovery, and adaptation capabilities. These four abilities comprise 
the NAS definition of resilience and are associated with different phases before 
and after infrastructure failures. Figure based on [12]. 
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accept them without significant examination. Their intuitive nature means that they also match 
established failure management practices for infrastructure systems and are easy to adopt across 
the numerous stakeholders involved in infrastructure protection. However, the very fact that these 
perspectives fit risk-based paradigms is an indication that they may only further risk management 
practices. If the promise of resilience is to change how infrastructure protection is done, then why 
would guiding theory deepen our commitment to outdated practices?  
Moreover, infrastructure crises in 2017 provide a constant reminder that resilience is still 
not working. After a single year of massive fires caused by poor design or faulty equipment [17], 
[18], the near-breaching of the largest dam in the US [19], and series of catastrophic hurricanes 
[20], it appears as if national and international infrastructure systems may be in a worse 
predicament than before Hurricane Katrina.  
What people need is a new way to think about resilient infrastructure systems that 
extends beyond these and other well-established perspectives. The problem with the NAS 
definition and critical functionality curve is not that they are wrong, but that they are too superficial 
to guide changes in infrastructure protection activities. Infrastructure owners and operators are 
already planning, preparing, absorbing, recovering, and adapting failed infrastructure all the time, 
rendering the definition meaningless for changing infrastructure protection away from risk. In 
practice, the critical functionality curve can only tell infrastructure stakeholders if they had 
resilience after a catastrophe happens, and offers limited prospective guidance to handle the next 
disaster. The fact that these two perspectives influence the majority of infrastructure resilience 
work today is symptomatic of a serious problem. Collectively, thinking about resilience is 
misplaced in the critical infrastructure literature. As the library that hinges on these ideas 
continues exponential growth, infrastructure systems will remain vulnerable to surprise. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to come to terms with growing misconceptions about 
resilience that dominate the infrastructure discourse and offer new ways to think about resilient 
infrastructure systems. The NAS definition and critical functionality curve are the product of 
misconceptions held by experts across resilience literature. A new way of thinking about resilient 
infrastructure systems is needed to correct the fundamental misconceptions that lead to bad 
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theory and advance entirely new definitions and models unlike those seen before. Thus, this work 
focuses on addressing four fundamental misconceptions to help move research towards the 
development of a new theory of resilient infrastructure systems. Each chapter is centered on 
understanding the building blocks that make up resilient infrastructure research – data, goals, 
systems, and failures – where the misconceptions about resilience that pervade the literature are 
summarized as: 
 Misconception 1: More data and advanced computational techniques will result in faster 
and better decision-making, with fewer cascading losses, deaths, and economic impacts.  
 Misconception 2: Resilience is a good thing that successful systems do, need, or have 
when faced with adversity, suggesting more resilience is always better.  
 Misconception 3: Infrastructure resilience is achieved by hardening existing system 
components and designing automated, redundant, smart, or otherwise technological 
solutions to reduce the probability of losses. 
 Misconception 4: Cascading failure models act as a means to simulate initiating events, 
study different failure mechanisms, and predict expected losses. 
 
More succinctly, it is commonly believed that: 
 more data and data analysis tools will improve infrastructure resilience, 
 pursuing resilience will make infrastructure systems better, 
 resilience is achieved by lowering the probability of component failure, 
 the consequence of cascading failure events can predicted with engineering models. 
 
On the surface, each statement summarizes a reasonable position guiding numerous studies 
across resilient infrastructure literature. However, like the NAS definition and critical functionality 
curve, these statements give superficial treatment to the way data, goals, systems, and failures 
influence action. In reality, each statement is preventing us from realizing the goal of creating 
resilient infrastructure systems, because:  
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 Clarification 1: More data is not better – being able to access the right information when 
needed is. Data analytics on their own may misinform failure management activities by 
focusing decisions on the wrong information at the wrong time.  
 Clarification 2: Pursuing resilience does not guarantee that infrastructure will be 
protected from all hazards because the act of pursuing resilience, itself, has inherent 
risks. A single resilience strategy has both benefits and risks, and managing future 
failures requires infrastructure systems that can switch between multiple resilience 
strategies to match shifting stress contexts. 
 Clarification 3: Technologies cannot solve resilience problems on their own because 
infrastructure systems are comprised of both technologies and people. Reducing the 
probability of infrastructure failure does nothing to reduce failure consequences dictated 
by human action.  
 Clarification 4: Measuring the consequences after cascading failures occur does little to 
support decision-making during cascading failures as they happen. Again, ignoring the 
influence people have on the outcome of cascades means the predicted consequences 
from models may be entirely different from real, surprising situations.  
Taken together, resilience is not gained by more data, better goals, novel technologies, or failure 
measures. Resilience is gained by understanding and improving the processes that dictate how 
data is used, goals are set, technologies are developed, and failures are studied. In other words, 
resilience is not gained from more objects (nouns), it is gained by changing and improving actions 
(verbs). Only with a better understanding of these processes can we reveal ways in which 
infrastructure systems succeed and fail when faced with unforeseen and unknown surprises. Only 
then can one begin to change infrastructure resilience, itself a verb rather than a noun, by shifting 
the processes themselves and changing the ways in which surprises are managed in the future.   
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Four processes defined in literature help frame this perspective on resilience: sensing, 
anticipating, adapting, and learning (SAAL) [4], [5], [21]–[25]. Since all SAAL processes are 
dynamic and interacting, a simple way to think about them is with a control loop linking an 
infrastructure system to the outside world (Fig. 2). Prior to studying any infrastructure system, 
researchers develop a conceptual model that delineates a boundary between what is included in 
analysis and what is ignored (the rest of the world). Within this model is a dynamic infrastructure 
system under consideration. Infrastructure dynamics such as the provision of electricity are 
dictated by the people and technologies act via the SAAL processes. Power grids sense power 
flows and system state, anticipate changes in service provision such as shifting weather and 
demand, adapt to shifting context to maintain power balance and delivery, and learn whether 
Figure 2 A Simple Control Loop Representation of SAAL Processes for Infrastructure 
Systems. 
Sensing, anticipating, adapting, and learning processes dictate the way in which 
infrastructure systems interact with the world. The control loop representation is 
meant to signify that the processes are dynamic and any change to one processes will 
affect the interactions among all of them. The chapters of this dissertation correspond 
to new knowledge associated with specific processes, e.g., Ch. 2 advances sensing 
processes by analyzing the treatment of data for infrastructure resilience.  
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current practices are fulfilling intended goals. These processes are generic in Fig. 2, as all 
infrastructure systems sense information from the world, anticipate desired or undesired future 
states with internal processes, adapt to situations to change future states, and learn through 
interactions with its environment.  
Fig. 2 also provides a structure to think about the papers presented in this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 discusses the meaning and use of data analytics to turn data into decisions and 
presents new ways to think about infrastructure sensing processes. Chapter 3 questions whether 
approaches to infrastructure adaptation are making infrastructure systems resilient, and presents 
a new way to advance infrastructure adaptation via resilience strategies for electric power, 
transportation, and water systems. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on anticipation of future large-scale 
blackouts in power grids, and uses a case study of South Korea to reveal the limitations of 
network science and cascading failure models for infrastructure design. These chapters 
demonstrate that system and failure models must include both social and technological 
perspectives to offer improvements to current emergency management practices. Additional 
summary and a key figure for each chapter is provided at the end of this introduction. 
This dissertation concludes with a path forward to a new theory of resilience based on 
resilience processes. Where current approaches to infrastructure resilience research hinge upon 
having the best data, strategies, and models, future resilience theories will be more nuanced 
because more data is not necessarily good, there is no single best resilience strategy, and 
conflicting and new models are useful and important. Hopefully, building on this work, future 
resilient infrastructure systems will bring a safer future for society. 
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Chapter-wise summary 
Table 1 Chapter 2 Summary  
Chapter 2: Rethinking Resilience Analytics 
Research 
Questions 
Do data analytics on their own offer a means to advance critical 
infrastructure resilience? What are the benefits and/or drawbacks to relying 
on data analytics for infrastructure resilience?  
Approach Review theoretical perspectives on data analytics, systems modeling, and 
resilience engineering. 
Deliverable Perspective article in the journal Risk Analysis for the special issue 
Resilience Analytics for Cyber-Physical-Social Systems 
Intellectual Merit Identifies pitfalls in using descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive data 
analytics for infrastructure resilience. Demonstrates how analytics are 
capable of responding to situational surprise, but will be challenged by 
fundamental surprises. Argues for caution and sets forth a research agenda 
that may help manage overuse of some analytic models that obviate the 
need for a human-in-the-loop 
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Key Figure for Chapter 2 
Fig 3 The Relationship Between Analytic Models, Users, Modelers, and the Real 
World.  
The inner loop in this figure represents a simplified way for how resilience analytics 
are used in CPS networks. Big data inputs are transformed by analytic models for 
descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive decision support. Model users embedded in 
CPS networks then decide and act upon model outputs, where no action still 
constitutes a decision. Actions taken by users affect the real world and feeds new 
inputs back into analytic models. Within this simple loop, feedback from the real 
world may contain unexpected observations (i.e., a ‘situational surprise’) that can be 
accommodated within current models. However, the inclusion of a 'modeler' who 
creates and updates big data analytics introduces additional dependencies that form 
an outer feedback loop and confounds the simple model. Both the interpretation of a 
user's decision frame by the modeler and the influence of real world stimuli on 
modeler may produce an incomplete pre-analytic vision and lead to inappropriate 
analytic models. Moreover, novel and rare experiences may characteristically change 
a user's decision frame or a modeler's pre-analytic vision (i.e., fundamental surprise) 
which may upend previous model assumptions and require the development of 
entirely new analytics. 
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Table 2 Chapter 3 Summary 
Chapter 3: Robustness and Extensibility in Infrastructure Systems 
Research 
Questions 
Is there a single, universal strategy to make infrastructure systems resilient, 
or, do multiple competing resilience strategies exist? If multiple strategies 
exist, what makes each strategy distinct? What are the benefits and/or 
drawbacks to choosing one strategy over another? Are resilience strategies 
mutually exclusive? 
Approach Review risk analysis and resilience engineering literature for infrastructure 
resilience strategies. Identify real-world examples of resilient infrastructure 
to demonstrate benefits and drawbacks to resilience strategies in action. 
Define a list of possible resilient design strategies for infrastructure 
systems.  
Deliverable Peer-reviewed journal article. 
Intellectual Merit This work clarifies the meaning of the word resilience and its use in 
infrastructure systems. We find multiple, distinct strategies available to 
make infrastructure systems more resilient and demonstrate the 
advantages of this pluralistic view of resilience. We expound two of these 
strategies, robustness and extensibility, for infrastructure design, operation, 
and management. Resulting conclusions are: 1) robustness and 
extensibility are different strategies for resilience because they draw upon 
different system characteristics, 2) neither robustness nor extensibility can 
prevent all hazards, 3) while infrastructure systems can perform robustness 
and extensibility simultaneously, the drawbacks associated with each 
strategy are different. 
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Key Figure Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Relationship between Robustness and Extensibility Strategies.  
Robustness and extensibility are two strategies used to help infrastructure systems 
manage disruptions. Robustness strategies are best at managing situation 
surprises, and where they fail, improvisational strategies of extensibility are required 
to succeed (represented by the red circle). Likewise, there are benefits gained from 
switching strategies (represented by the green circle) when serendipity enables new 
robust and extensible capabilities. Infrastructure resilience is not one strategy or 
another, but the ability to change strategies in response to changing stressors and 
organizational state 
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Table 4 Chapter 4 Summary 
Chapter 4: Sociotechnical Network Analysis for Power Grid Resilience in South Korea 
Research 
Questions 
How can network analysis inform critical infrastructure emergency 
management policies and practices? What is the sociotechnical blackout 
management context in South Korea? How does the identification of critical 
infrastructures within the South Korean Power Grid (KPG) offer 
improvements to existing blackout management policies and practices? 
How does the identification of information-sharing and decision-making 
organizations for blackout management in Korea offer improvements to 
national blackout management policies? What, if any, combined guidance 
do these parallel studies provide Korean blackout management policies? 
Approach Create corresponding power grid and social network models for South 
Korea based on national policies. Identify critical power transmission 
infrastructure and blackout management organizations using betweenness 
measures developed for power grid and social networks, respectively. Use 
infrastructure and organizational criticality results to recommend 
improvements to blackout management policies. 
Deliverable Research article published in the journal Complexity  
Intellectual Merit Developed first sociotechnical network analysis (STNA) for a critical 
infrastructure system. Found ways to offer broad recommendations to 
improve blackout management in Korea using infrastructure and social 
network analyses. Found that neither power grid nor social network 
analysis was sufficient on its own to offer specific recommendations, 
instead combined analyses and guidance is necessary to specify 
improvements to national policies.  
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Key Figure Chapter 4 
 
Figure 5 Aggregate Criticality Scores for Korean Power Grid Infrastructure by Emergency 
Management Region.  
The top left image of Korea presents the amount of generation and substation buses located 
in each region (A), where all other images show the normalized total criticality score for each 
region (B, C, and D). Thus, percent scale refers to quantity of infrastructure (A) and 
aggregated criticality score (B, C, and D). Regions are labelled in (A) with abbreviations: 
Gyeonggi-Do (GGD), Gangwon-Do (GD), Chungcheongnam-Do (CCND), Chungcheongbuk-Do 
(CCBD), Gyeongsangnam-Do (GSND), Gyeongsangbuk-Do (GSBD), Jeollanam-Do (JND), 
Jeollabuk-Do (JBD), Seoul-Si (SS), Incheon-Si (IS), Daejeon-Si (DJS), Gwangju-Si (GS), Daegu-
Si (DGS), Ulsan-Si (US), and Busan-Si (BS). 
GD SS 
IS 
GGD 
CCBD 
CCND 
GSND 
GSBD 
US 
BS 
DGS 
DJS 
JND 
JBD 
GS 
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Table 5 Chapter 5 Summary 
Chapter 5: Advancing Cascading Failure Models for Improved Blackout Management in South 
Korea 
Research 
Questions 
How does the importance of South Korean blackout management 
organizations change during cascading failure events? What can models 
teach us about power failures during cascades, rather than after them?  
Approach Advance a failure model for measuring congestion-based cascades for 
power grids. Generate a weighted social network or South Korean 
organizations based on the frequency interorganizational partnerships are 
active during cascades. Measure shifting organizational importance across 
cascades with multiple betweenness measures for weighted networks. 
Identify critical organizations during normal operations and extended social 
network states. 
Deliverable Research article for submission to Nature Energy 
Intellectual Merit Developed first link between cascading failures and the complex social 
context influencing decision making as cascades occur. Found shifting 
importance of organizations that relate to shifting cascading failure risk 
across the South Korean Peninsula. Pinpoint organizations that can support 
surprising power grid failures by filling information sharing and decision-
making roles when critical organizations are unavailable or overloaded. 
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Key Figure Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Cascading Failure Results for South Korea and Associated Weighted Blackout 
Management Social Networks.  
When a single substation or generation bus fails, electricity redistributes across the grid and 
total dispatchable reserve margin changes. The light red region in the above graph 
encompasses all reserve margin gains and losses from N-1 failures in the South Korean power 
grid, where top and bottom dashed lines are the largest gains and losses, respectively. Social 
network links form based on which organization owns and operates stressed infrastructures, 
where stressed infrastructures are located, and how stressed they are (see Methods). The 
weight of each social network link is the mean weight across all N-1 failure scenarios with a 
normalized, maximum partnership strength of 1. Strong and weak partnerships are shown 
across the cascading process as red and blue links, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RETHINKING RESILIENCE ANALYTICS 
 
This chapter is in review in the journal Risk Analysis for the special issue on Resilience Analytics 
for Cyber-Physical-Social Systems and appears as submitted prior to review. The citation for this 
article is: Alderson, D.L., Eisenberg, D.A., Seager, T.P. (2018) Rethinking Resilience Analytics. 
Risk Analysis, in review. 
 
 
The Allure of Resilience Analytics 
Recent advances in information technologies have dramatically improved our ability to 
capture and use data. For instance, the trend towards an internet-of-things (IoT) means that 
everything from lightbulbs to appliances to traffic signals becomes both a type of internet-enabled 
sensor that measures the environment and/or an actuator that can attempt to control it. Similarly, 
social media applications now collect massive data from crowd-sourced observations, including 
earthquake and infectious disease detection that may improve responsive actions. This ability to 
connect data and decision--at large scale and in real time--means that we can potentially respond 
and adapt to an increasingly volatile world in ways previously unthinkable. 
This recent revolution of so-called ‘big data’ requires associated analytics to reveal 
patterns, trends, and associations between physical systems and human behavior. In business, 
big data firms Alphabet (i.e., Google) and Facebook demonstrate the global impact of data 
analytics by using novel techniques like machine learning to guide searches and target 
customers. In academia, researchers further demonstrate the importance of analytics for 
investigating previously untenable phenomena, such as the function of the human brain. For the 
purposes of this work, we focus on data analytics developed for operating and managing critical 
infrastructure systems such as the electric grid, financial markets, communications, and 
transportation. These systems are critical because they provide services like electricity and 
mobility that ensure the safety and function of society, are complex due to their wide geographic 
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scale, interdependencies, and human-technological interactions, and are producing significant 
amounts of data every second of the day. The picture that is commonly suggested is that 
continued advances in the use of data analytics will bring unprecedented levels of capability, 
efficiency, and new knowledge to infrastructure systems. Government [26], [27] and the military 
[28] are now working as quickly as they can to try to make sense of data analytics and turn it into 
tactical, operational, and strategic advantage.   
Recently, Barker et al. coined the neologism resilience analytics to mean “the systematic 
use of advanced data-driven methods to understand, visualize, design, and manage 
interdependent infrastructures to enhance their resilience and the resilience of the communities 
and services that rely upon them" [29].  The term emphasizes the use of analytic models in 
support of infrastructure operations and management decisions. Given that the complexities of 
multi-layered, interdependent infrastructure systems are beyond comprehension of any single 
individual or organization, the promise of resilience analytics is that more data and advanced 
computational techniques will result in faster and better decision-making, with fewer cascading 
losses, deaths, and economic impacts. The authors categorize the decision support offered by 
analytic models through (1) descriptive analytics to understand how infrastructure systems work, 
(2) predictive analytics to comprehend the course disasters are likely to take, and (3) prescriptive 
analytics to offer recommendations to direct systems towards better outcomes. Moreover, they 
organize the recommended targets of this analysis as cyber-physical-social (CPS) systems 
comprised of: 
 a) infrastructure networks "that enable essential 'lifeline' services for society (e.g., 
transportation, electric, power, communications)",  
 b) service networks comprised of "human systems that engage with these infrastructure 
systems during a disruption (e.g., emergency responders, humanitarian relief, debris 
removal)" 
 c) community networks of "the interconnected society that the other networks support 
(e.g., relationships among people and communities)".  
  18 
Collectively, the combination of analytic category (1-3) and target network (a-c) presents a 
taxonomy that is intended to allow researchers to "argue for new frameworks for resilience of 
large-scale systems from a data-centric viewpoint," with considerable emphasis on crowdsourced 
social media. 
It is certainly true that US infrastructure providers would benefit from the improved the 
decision-making that resilience analytics aims to offer. Essentially all major infrastructure crises in 
2017 were exacerbated by maladaptive interactions across infrastructure, service, and 
community networks. For example, in February 2017 decisions across cyber-physical and service 
networks to use a broken and untested infrastructure led to the near collapse of largest dam in 
the United States, the Oroville Dam [19]. Later in the year, damages experienced during 
hurricanes Harvey in Houston and Maria in Puerto Rico were exacerbated due to risky building 
development practices and mismanaged recovery efforts [20] across cyber-physical and social 
networks. Considering these and other ongoing threats to infrastructure systems, it behooves all 
stakeholders involved in infrastructure, including government agencies, first responders, 
infrastructure providers, users, and others, to employ analytic techniques in service of reducing 
the impacts of future, potentially calamitous events.  
The temptation to adopt and develop resilience analytics without question is almost 
overwhelming. However, without critical examination of the assumptions of existing analytics and 
the limitations they create, resilience analytics may ironically expose the public to grave dangers 
resulting from overconfidence, myopia, loss of adaptive or innovative capacity, or misconceptions 
that result in more brittle CPS systems. This paper offers just such an examination. We 
interrogate the initial 'framing' of resilience analytics by questioning whether analytic models will 
be able to handle surprising disruptions that cannot be predicted a priori. We find that resilience 
analytics may be capable to adapt to situational surprises, but will remain unable to adapt to 
fundamental surprises that motivate their need, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the near-breaching 
of the Oroville Dam. We conclude that pursuit of resilience analytics is subject to limitation and 
premature, as CPS systems that adopt them may ironically become more vulnerable to these 
events in the future.  
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The Role of Models 
In general, analytics harness the availability of big data to inform decisions through the 
application of statistical and mathematical models. Since there is no single definition of 'model', 
for simplicity we adopt the lexicon of Brown [30]: "A model is an abstraction that emphasizes 
certain aspects of reality to assess or understand the behavior of a system under study." This 
definition is broad enough to cover physical models (e.g., miniature vehicles or buildings), logical 
models (e.g., of software), and information models (potentially scaling to represent all the working 
cyber-physical infrastructure in a city). Big data analytic models are often classified in three sub-
categories [29]: 
 Descriptive analytics that describe and help visualize the performance of CPS networks.  
 Predictive analytics that determine complex patterns, relationships among variables, and 
quantify the likelihood of future events. 
 Prescriptive analytics that identify and evaluate a feasible course of actions given a set of 
constraints, possible interventions, and objectives. 
 
Models are so important that even understanding the role of analytics for improving 
resilience requires a model for how analytics are used in CPS networks (see: Fig. 7, inner loop). 
Big data analytics interact with the real world by taking high velocity, volume, and variety 
information assets as inputs and transforming them with models into useful outputs for engineers, 
developers, operators, managers, regulators, and others embedded in CPS networks (i.e., users). 
Predictive and prescriptive analytics use explicit models to guide user decisions and actions. 
Although it is possible to describe and visualize systems without an explicit model,  the choice of 
what to collect and any inference a user makes on such data implicitly depends on model of what 
is information assets are relevant and how to use those assets. Model users then take actions 
that change the real world which feeds back new information assets into analytic models. 
Together, the interaction between models, users, and the real world creates a simple 
sociotechnical feedback loop that influences CPS network dynamics and updates analytics to 
meet new challenges. 
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The development of resilience analytics also requires the inclusion of a modeler into this 
feedback loop that interprets the values of the users embedded in CPS networks and translates 
them into descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive analytics. The initial formation of a resilience 
analytic model requires a modeler to interpret a user's decision frame, i.e., the user's background, 
beliefs, goals, needs, and other personal and contextual values that influence their behavior. 
Existing definitions of resilience analytics guide model development by summarizing common 
values found across infrastructure sectors, federal agencies, and academic literature. For 
example, common user beliefs motivating the need for resilience include the increasing frequency 
and severity of large-scale disasters that challenge lifeline services [31], the growing existence 
and capacity to harness big data [29], and the increasing interdependence among cyber-physical 
and social networks [32]–[34]. Moreover, common user goals are captured in resilience 
definitions across the US Federal government, such as improving the ability for cyber-physical 
infrastructure systems, "to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse 
events," [9], the ability of service providers and organizations, "to recognize threats and hazards 
and make adjustments that will improve future protection efforts and risk reduction measures," 
[2], and the ability of communities, "to prepare for anticipated hazards, adapt to changing 
conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions,” [35]. The challenge posed to 
modelers, then, is to produce analytics that embed these values and support users to make 
decisions that help CPS networks withstand, adapt to, and recover from disruptions. 
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Fig 7 The Relationship Between Analytic Models, Users, Modelers, and the Real 
World.  
The inner loop in this figure represents a simplified way for how resilience analytics 
are used in CPS networks. Big data inputs are transformed by analytic models for 
descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive decision support. Model users embedded in 
CPS networks then decide and act upon model outputs, where no action still 
constitutes a decision. Actions taken by users affect the real world and feeds new 
inputs back into analytic models. Within this simple loop, feedback from the real 
world may contain unexpected observations (i.e., a ‘situational surprise’) that can be 
accommodated within current models. However, the inclusion of a 'modeler' who 
creates and updates big data analytics introduces additional dependencies that form 
an outer feedback loop and confounds the simple model. Both the interpretation of a 
user's decision frame by the modeler and the influence of real world stimuli on 
modeler may produce an incomplete pre-analytic vision and lead to inappropriate 
analytic models. Moreover, novel and rare experiences may characteristically change 
a user's decision frame or a modeler's pre-analytic vision (i.e., fundamental surprise) 
which may upend previous model assumptions and require the development of 
entirely new analytics. 
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Unfortunately, the translation of a user's decision frame into models is not so simple. A 
modeler also has backgrounds, beliefs, goals, needs, and other personal and contextual values 
comprising a pre-analytic vision (Schumpter [36], Costanza [37]) that influences the act of 
modeling itself. Although a decision frame and a pre-analytic vision are comprised of similar 
values, we create a distinction between them because discrepancies among these two sets of 
values may limit resulting analytics. For example, it is common for a user's decision frame to 
change during model development and render previous modelling efforts useless. Likewise, a 
modeler's pre-analytic vision may include technical decisions that reduce the accuracy, 
throughput, and usability of analytics with or without user knowledge. These and other 
discrepancies may even exist when the user and modeler are the same individual. Thus, it is 
necessary to separate the modeler in the sociotechnical loop from the user and add additional 
feedback dependencies that can influence model development. 
Bringing the modeler-in-the-loop introduces at least two confounding dependencies that 
challenge resilience analytics (see: Fig. 7, outer loop). The first dependency between the user 
and modeler represents the necessity for translation and interpretation of user values. This 
dependency emphasizes that analytics are limited by a pre-analytic vision that may obscure 
model outputs and decision support. George Box's famous aphorism "All models are wrong, but 
some are useful" reminds us that analytics are only meaningful in their decision context which 
may be unavailable to a modeler. The second dependency between the real world and the 
modeler represents the way in which a modeler's values and pre-analytic vision can be influenced 
by external stimuli. Analytic models must also be regularly updated and modified as both the 
user's and modeler's values also change over time. Costanza [37] elaborates this fact by 
emphasizing the credibility of analytics depends on constant reconciliation between a modeler's 
and user's values. "...[C]redibility proceeds from honest discussion of this underlying [pre-analytic] 
vision and its inherently subjective elements, as well as from constant, pragmatic testing of 
conclusions against real-world problems, rather than by appealing to a nonexistent 
objectivity....[T]he ultimate goal is therefore not truth, but quality and utility." Together, these two 
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dependencies have a direct and possibly underappreciated impact on how analytics improve CPS 
resilience. 
Surprise Happens 
Linking inner loop decision-making to outer loop model development raises unresolved 
issues for analytic models that can inhibit CPS resilience. Specifically, for analytics to improve the 
resilience of CPS networks, they will need to be responsive to unforeseeable natural and man-
made disruptions that challenge lifeline services, infrastructure management practices, and 
community safety and security. This means outer loop dependencies that include the modeler are 
critical for determining which disruptions CPS networks can handle. For simplicity, we refer to 
disruptions that are unknown a priori and challenge CPS networks as surprises. This notion of 
surprise frames an important question for resilience analytics: can analytic models adapt to 
surprise?  
To answer this question we define two distinct surprises that challenge CPS networks: 
situational surprise and fundamental surprise. In general, surprises occur in CPS systems 
because their complex nature makes it difficult to know all relevant dependencies that may cause, 
exacerbate, or even help manage a disruption. Finding anomalies that cause surprises in cyber-
physical systems is a normal activity (e.g., debugging) which often reveals underappreciated 
dependencies among physical and digital assets [38]. More rarely, surprises occur that cause 
astonishment in an individual or group that may change their background, beliefs, and goals in 
such a way that previous conceptions of the CPS system may be deemed irrelevant. Cognitive 
scientists typically distinguish these situations as experiencing a situational surprise vs. a 
fundamental surprise. Citing foundational work by Lanir [39], Webb and Wears [39] state four 
distinguishing features: "Fundamental surprise refutes basic beliefs about 'how things work', while 
situational surprise is compatible with previous beliefs. Second, in fundamental surprise one 
cannot define in advance the issues for which one must be alert. Third, situational and 
fundamental surprise differ in the value brought by information about the future. Situational 
surprise can be averted or mitigated by such foresight, while advance information on fundamental 
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surprise actually causes the surprise. ...And finally, learning from situational surprise seems easy, 
but learning from fundamental surprise is difficult." 
The central role models play in decision-making shown in Fig. 7 reveals at least two ways 
in which resilience analytics may be responsive to surprise: (1) feedback from real world inputs, 
and (2) feedback from modelers. Type-1 feedback depicted in the lower half of Fig. 7 is 
responsive to situational surprise in the form of updating model structure from real world inputs. 
Some analytic models automatically adjust behavior and even 'learn' from discrepancies between 
model outputs and observations from these surprises. However, Type-1 feedback is 
unresponsive to fundamental surprise because neither users and nor models can change the pre-
analytic values embedded in the model. For example, learning algorithms must be trained prior to 
use, and are unable to access characteristically different inputs than what was chosen during 
model training. There is no way for analytic model to update its internal structure to a fundamental 
surprise that deems current model inputs obsolete. Even in situations that fundamentally change 
the user's decision frame, without Type-2 feedback there is no way to fundamentally change the 
central model. In these situations, a user's best option would be to make decisions without the 
support of analytic model rendering it useless. Because fundamental surprise can only occur from 
Type-2 feedback, even the most advanced machine learning or artificial intelligence models 
cannot be fundamentally surprised. Simply put, analytic models cannot adapt to a fundamental 
surprise because they cannot experience a fundamental surprise. 
The key point is that the modeler, not the model, creates both the limitations of resilience 
analytics as well as the solution for how to adapt to fundamental surprise. Including the modeler-
in-the-loop makes analytics susceptible to having the wrong pre-analytic vision during initial 
model development. Analytics predicated on misconceptions, or draw our attention to the wrong 
things, cannot be improved by better data or machine learning processes. In fact, more and better 
information assets in the wrong model may reinforce misconceptions embedded in results, 
leading to greater danger resulting from a false sense of security and/or poor decision-making. A 
view of resilience analytics that only considers the inner loop in Fig. 7 is susceptible in this 
manner. Likewise, fundamental surprise requires a modeler-in-the-loop to update models and 
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ensure CPS systems adapt to unforeseen events. When modelers identify new ways to structure 
analytics that where otherwise unknown during initial model development or users determine 
current model outputs obsolete, resilience requires the model to fundamentally change. Without 
Type-2 feedback, analytic models lack the capacity to adapt. Again, a view of resilience analytics 
that only considers the inner control loop in Fig. 7 is susceptible in this manner. 
Thus, no analytic model on its own, no matter how well-informed with observation during 
its initial development, can ever result in a resilient CPS networks. At minimum, resilience 
analytics require Type-2 feedback to change pre-analytic visions when existing models are no 
longer working, even if this form of feedback is also the reason why George Box's aphorism 
remains true.  
Implications for Cyber-Physical Social Systems 
Fundamental Surprise without a Modeler-in-the-Loop 
Many past disasters that challenged real CPS networks demonstrate the need for Type-2 
feedback. CPS networks represent a diversity of lifeline infrastructure systems, including 
financial, transportation, electric power, and water systems among others. Prominent events that 
fundamentally surprised established models of infrastructure, service provider, or community 
response in these systems include the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the near-breaching of 
the Oroville dam in 2017. Here, we present short explanations of these events, establishing when 
fundamental surprise occurred, when models changed, and the resilient results. These case 
studies are not meant to be comprehensive and further reading is provided at the beginning of 
each description. Moreover, for brevity, we present only few, well-known events during each 
disaster to focus on a single fundamental surprise (Fig. 8). Finally, to derive general principles of 
surprise we organize each case study with the following sub-events: 
(1) People embedded in CPS networks realized that continued use of established models 
only exacerbated problems. (2) Realizing past models were flawed forced people to 
fundamentally change their values. (3) New values enabled users embedded in the CPS 
networks forming new decision frames. (4) Resilient response required Type-2 feedback that 
abandoned past analytics for new models. This was done either by modelers who changed 
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analytics for the users, or by the users who chose to ignore established models and improvise 
decisions. (5) Changing models resulted in resilience, i.e., less damages incurred and/or faster 
recovery of lifeline services. 
 
 
 
The 9/11 Terrorist Attack 
Based on summarized accounts from [40], [41]. 
(1) At the time, the mental model that flight crews were trained to adopt was that 
hijackers will have demands for money, freedom and political power. And that negotiations should 
Fig 8 Fundamental Surprise Experienced By Users With No Modeler-In-The-Loop. 
Past crisis events such as Black Monday, the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Tohoku 
earthquake, and the near-breaching of the Oroville dam included fundamental 
surprises where users found existing analytics to be insufficient to meet 
emergency response needs. Because there was no “modeler-in-the-loop”, users 
that experienced these surprises had no effective way to communicate new 
analytic needs and adapt models to fundamentally new situations. The result was 
users abandoned analytics (represented by red “x’s”), and were forced to 
improvise actions without additional decision support. 
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best left to the professionals, and not to flight crews. They were taught non-confrontational 
strategies that acquiesced to hijacker demands. Their observations indicated that they were being 
hijacked. They predicted that they would be directed to fly to somewhere and suffer prolonged 
and dangerous negotiations. They prescribed a strategy of acquiescence that they predicted 
would result in the eventual release of passengers and crew. 
(2) By contrast, United Flight 93 benefited from cell phone calls (observations) that gave 
them enough information to form a new mental model. They made different predictions. They 
knew they were as good as dead. (3) The crew formed a new decision frame that focused on 
taking the plane from the hijackers or cause the plane to crash prematurely. 
(4) Together, both the crew (service providers) and passengers (communities) 
abandoned established model for dealing with hijackers focused on waiting out negotiations and 
implemented the new model focused on taking the plane back from the hijackers in midair. (5) 
Implementing the new model led to the plane crashing before it could be used as a weapon and 
spared the White House from destruction. The crew and passengers lost their lives, but saved the 
lives of others. 
The Near-Breaching of the Oroville Dam 
Based on summarized accounts from [42], [43]. 
(1) Prior to the crisis, the frame of reference for California Department of Water 
Resources (DWR) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was to make 
decisions based on reservoir-wide risk analyses that identified potential dam failure modes. The 
most recent analysis in 2014 ignored structural problems from initial dam design, insufficient 
maintenance practices, and poor mountainside geological conditions that contributed to the crisis. 
(2) Forensic reports show significant evidence of each misgiving existed before the 2014 risk 
analysis.  
Once the primary spillway failed, dam management was faced with the complex decision 
of whether to: a) continue using the broken primary spillway, or b) use the ungated, emergency 
spillway. Expertise divided decision-makers, as operations personnel, management executives, 
and regulators favored maintaining the frame of reference that the dame was safe and use the 
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emergency spillway, yet (3) geologists, safety engineers, and emergency managers insisted on 
using the broken primary spillway. The eventual decision that split the difference between both 
options, to use the primary spillway at reduced discharge rates, is cited as the one that led to the 
near-collapse of the dam. Once the emergency spillway was activated, (4) geologist onsite 
warned of immediate dam collapse. (5) Operators controlling the sluice gates to the primary 
spillway opened it without direct order to decrease flow rate over the emergency spillway and 
prevent mountainside erosion.  
Fundamental Surprise without a User-in-the-Loop 
Type-2 feedback is unavoidable in the current study of CPS network resilience. Analytic 
models function at the scale and speed of real cyber-physical and social networks, effectively 
acting as a bridge between a user's decision frame, a modeler's pre-analytic vision, and real 
world phenomena. However, the increased use of some analytic techniques like machine learning 
and artificial intelligence that create their own internal algorithmic structure may circumvent the 
need or possibility for Type-2 feedback. These analytic techniques are able to answer certain 
types of questions (e.g., classification) based on data alone and generate their own internal 
algorithmic structure in ways people do not yet understand. These models may then produce 
descriptions, predictions, and prescriptions in such a way that neither a modeler nor a user may 
be able reflect on why the model produced this output. When using these analytics in situations 
where it is easy to check model outputs against expected results (e.g., classifying a known 
photograph), then it may be unnecessary to understand why recommendations were made for 
Type-2 feedback. The complexity of real world CPS networks, though, makes it impossible for the 
user to accurately compare outputs to pre-analytic expectations. This means using machine 
learning algorithms for CPS resilience is equivalent to replacing users with models that are 
incapable to recognize whether analytic outputs is a situational or a fundamental surprise (Fig. 9).  
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Fig 9 Fundamental Surprise Experienced By Modelers with No User-In-The-Loop. 
In some cases, the user-in-the-loop is a technological system that acts at the scale 
and speed of infrastructure. Moreover, increased use of some big data analytics 
like machine learning impede the ability for human users to compare model 
outputs to real-world situations, effectively limiting user ability to recognize 
fundamental surprise. In both cases, there was no “user-in-the-loop”. Modelers 
that experience fundamental surprise have no effective way to align analytic needs 
to fundamentally new situations. Moreover, the translation of a new frame of 
reference into new analytic models may be too slow to interdict maladaptive 
actions hard coded into existing models and technologies. Type-2 feedback is lost 
where red “x’s” are shown. 
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Because Type-2 feedback is crucial for resilience, increased use of machine learning and 
other big data analytics may have the unintended consequence of hindering CPS resilience, 
rather than helping it. The four case studies above demonstrate the necessity to adapt models to 
fundamental surprise. When models are untenable by humans, then pre-analytic values 
embedded in the model is also untenable by humans. The increased use of these models further 
inhibits the capacity for people to reflect on the dynamics of CPS systems effectively negating 
any attempt to adjust models to fundamental surprise. This inhibits Type-2 feedback and a 
necessary mode of adaptive response. 
Removing the user-in-the-loop also forewarns the potential danger of embedding 
resilience analytics in autonomous processes.  A key objective in the use of analytics is to 
process data of extreme volume, velocity, and variety, and the ability to leverage large-scale 
computational resources means that we can now tackle problems at scale--both in terms of size 
and speed--in a manner that humans could never fathom. Many CPS systems, such as the 
electric power grid and financial markets, already operate on timescales that make human-in-the-
loop intervention impractical, and tales of their large-scale cascading failure are legendary.  
However, a push to make resilience analytics that are too fast to override and too complex to 
properly understand will preclude humans from being 'in the loop'. CPS systems will always be 
vulnerable to fundamental surprise in this context, because there is no ability to re-frame analytic 
models. When disruptions like Black Monday or the Tohoku Earthquake occur, all that will be left 
is to try to understand after the fact why things went inexplicably wrong (or right) in the aftermath. 
Rethinking Resilience Analytics 
A Revised Taxonomy 
A first step towards analytics that include the modeler-in-the-loop would be the adoption of 
resilience taxonomies that make situational and fundamental surprise explicit. The taxonomy 
originally described in Hollnagel et al. [44] and discussed and refined by Park et al. [4], Hollnagel 
[45], and Seager et al. [5] offers one approach to frame analytic models relative to Type-1 and 
Type-2 feedback. Hollnagel [45] defines four abilities that built systems like CPS networks need 
to ensure that situational and fundamental surprise lead to positive outcomes: 
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 "Knowing what to do: how to respond to regular and irregular disruptions and 
disturbances either by implementing a prepared set of responses or by adjusting normal 
functioning."  
 "Knowing what to look for: how to monitor that which is or can become a threat in the 
near term. The monitoring must cover both events in the environment and the 
performance of the system itself." 
Fig 10 Four Key Abilities for Resilience (based on Hollnagel). 
Hollnagel [44] defines four abilities and their dependencies that dictate how CPS 
systems respond to disruptions. The critical ability dictating resilience to a 
situational or fundamental surprise is learning, i.e., the ability to change 
monitoring, responding, and anticipating practices. Feedback loop 1 does not 
engage learning, and cannot effectively respond to surprise. Feedback loops 2 and 
3 engage learning to improve resilience to situational surprise by updating models 
for monitoring and responding. Feedback loops 4 and 5 engage learning to 
improve resilience to fundamental surprise by updating how disruptions are 
anticipated prior to updating and changing models. 
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 "Knowing what has happened: how to learn from experience, in particular how to learn 
the right lessons from the right experience – successes as well as failures." 
 "Knowing what to expect: how to anticipate developments, threats, and opportunities 
further into the future, such as potential changes, disruptions, pressures and their 
consequences." 
 
Hollnagel's taxonomy provides a characteristically different pre-analytic vision than 
existing literature that relies on resilience definitions from Federal agencies. First, the taxonomy 
focuses on the processes CPS systems do to bring about positive outcomes (monitoring 
disruptions) rather than the resilient outcome itself (e.g., withstanding a disruption). Moreover, 
monitoring, responding, learning, and anticipating are continuous, proactive abilities where 
withstanding, adapting, and recovering (or otherwise) occur in reaction to a surprise. Finally, 
Hollnagel's abilities all occur simultaneously in time with explicit dependencies across them (Fig. 
10) were resilience abilities defined by Federal agencies refer to distinct stages in crisis response 
that are sequential in time. 
The dependencies among abilities in Hollnagel's taxonomy emphasize that key ability 
dictating Type-1 and Type 2 feedback is learning. In their discussion of surprise, Wears and 
Webb [39] emphasize that situational surprise can be anticipated, but fundamental surprise 
cannot, and that proactive learning and responding are critical in the presence of fundamental 
surprise. The embedded feedback loops in Hollnagel's taxonomy show learning processes 
updates monitoring, responding, and anticipating abilities for resilience (see: Fig. 10). In 
particular, situational surprise engages Type-1 feedback in loops 2 and 3, where learning 
processes update existing models for monitoring and responding without modifying previous 
expectations. Fundamental surprise engages Type-2 feedback in loops 4 and 5 as the formation 
of new expectations of real world phenomena leads to changes in how disruptions are 
anticipated. Learning in this way leads to a new frame of reference that requires responding and 
monitoring to be updated with characteristically new models.   
  33 
Hollnagel's taxonomy is important because it offers a simple way to categorize future 
analytic models - those that support Type-1 learning or Type-2 anticipating. Previous studies in 
resilience analytics do not consider which form or learning proposed analytic models support. 
According to Hollnagel's taxonomy, these studies may not consider the full extent of learning 
abilities available to CPS networks by overlooking anticipating as an ability influencing CPS 
resilience. However, Hollnagel's taxonomy makes clear the need for anticipating processes to be 
updated and engaged to adapt to fundamental surprises and can offer a simple way for modelers 
to classify their work for resilience research. This becomes relevant when positive outcomes for 
CPS systems require current expectations for resilience to be revised and analytic models to 
change.  
A Path Forward 
Overall, the resilience research community needs to rethink their role in developing 
resilience analytics for CPS networks. The limited, yet burgeoning research in resilience analytics 
focuses largely on establishing a pre-analytic vision for the research community that promotes the 
use of analytic techniques designed for high volume, velocity, and variety data. While overcoming 
technical challenges in analytic models is an important focus area for CPS networks, improving 
their resilience will require significant effort figuring out how to use them in a way that does not 
inhibit Type-2 feedback. In short, resilience analytics are not limited by a lack of computational 
tools, resilience analytics are limited by a lack of ways to adapt to fundamental surprise.  
Resilience is about adaptive capacity, and the resilience research community are a part 
of this process. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the near-breaching of the Oroville Dam would have 
benefited by having a modeler-in-the-loop to adapt established tools to unanticipated decision 
contexts. This means we, the research community, must be able to get outside our models. We 
need to find better ways to interpret a user's decision frame and translate that information into 
effective tools. We also need to become aware of our own values to ensure that the resilience 
analytics we produce have utility, rather than exacerbate problems. Finally, we need analytics 
that help us be explicit about forming new mental models. That is, CPS resilience analytics 
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research cannot just be about developing and applying new statistical techniques, resilience 
analytics need research about forming and adapting the pre-analytic vision as well. 
Unfortunately, we aren't at the point where we can apply big data analytics in a resilient 
way, because we still lack theory, methods, and tools to adapt models to fundamental surprise. In 
9/11 and Oroville, the best response users' had available was to abandon models and improvise. 
We envision a future where the modeler-in-the-loop takes an active role to support CPS network 
resilience and adapt models when needed. 
A challenge is that decision frames and pre-analytic visions are tacit values held be 
individuals and groups, and therefore unlikely to be amenable to analysis. Finding new ways to 
make a user's decision frame and a modeler's pre-analytic vision explicit is an important 
undertaking that should be promoted within the Risk Analysis community. Likewise, combining 
objective analytic models with these subjective understandings of resilience remains an important 
area of research for infrastructure systems. Since neither perspective is complete, the outputs 
from both need further reflection as more analytics are developed for CPS networks. Hollnagel's 
taxonomy offers one way to consider the relationship between CPS disruptions, models, and 
sociotechnical dynamics. A more resilient future where CPS systems are poised to adapt to 
surprises will require applying taxonomies like this one in the context of resilience research itself.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIBILITY IN INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS 
 
This chapter is provisionally accepted pending revisions in the journal Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety and appears as submitted prior to review. The citation for this article is: Eisenberg, 
D.A., Seager, T.P., Hinrichs, M.M., Kim, Y., Wender, B.A., Markolf, S., Thomas, J.E., Chester, 
M.V., Alderson, D.L., Park, J., Lai, Y-C., Linkov, I., Spierre Clark, S., Woods, D. (2018) Reliability 
Engineering & Systems Safety, In review. 
 
Introduction 
Prior to Holling's 1973 [46] seminal publication, the word "resilience" was used in few 
scientific settings – notably, in materials science to describe elastic deformation under stress, and 
in psychiatry and psychology to describe the characteristics of individuals that allow them to 
recover from psychological trauma [47]. These understandings of the word are analogous and 
consistent with the etymological roots of its original verb form, to resile, meaning “to return to a 
former position” [47], which is sometimes interpreted as "to bounce back" (e.g., Meerow, Newell, 
& Stults [48]). Building upon Holling’s work, this understanding persists in the natural sciences 
through groups like the Resilience Alliance, which describes resilience as "the capacity of a 
social-ecological system to absorb or withstand perturbations and other stressors such that the 
system remains within the same regime, essentially maintaining its structure and functions" [46], 
[49]–[51]. More recently, usage of resilience has increased exponentially across various 
disciplines [52] with each new adoption resulting in efforts to redefine its meaning to fit the 
purposes of broad applications like business, sustainability, and disaster risk reduction [15]. For 
example, the United States National Academy of Sciences now defines disaster resilience a "the 
ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse events" [9], where the 
United Nations defines disaster resilience as "the ability of a system, community or society 
exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in 
a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential 
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basic structures and functions," [10]. Both definitions draw upon the retrospective concept of 
returning to a former position through a process of recovery, but also include future and present 
temporal perspectives that seek to minimize hazardous outcomes in the first place. Holling's work 
expanded "resilience" from simple (material elasticity) and individual (psychology) applications to 
complex systems. Accommodating these new applications, understandings of the word resilience 
itself were made more complex. 
In ecology, resilience is a descriptive term that does not suggest one system state is 
better than any other. By contrast, in psychology, business, engineering, and other disciplines 
resilience is a normative term that largely suggests a preference for the status quo. The 
difference is most evident in contrasting the incorporation of recovery into the definitions of 
disaster resilience. To ecologists, recovery processes were dubbed “engineering resilience” [53] 
to segregate them from socio-ecological perspectives, despite this misnomer ignoring 
technological systems in the Resilience Alliance's canonical definition. Still, the distinction is of 
critical importance as the dominant view in design disciplines such as engineering, architecture, 
and urban planning is that resilience is a good thing that successful systems do, need, or have 
when faced with adversity [54], [55], suggesting more resilience is always better. This view is also 
evident in psychology, psychiatry, management, sustainability, and disaster risk reduction where 
resilience is the result of enacting positive coping capacities to better manage hazards and risks 
[48]. However, the original verb resile is not meant to evoke success. Rather, it has pejorative 
connotations, as in reneging on a commitment or retreating from a prior position [47]. The positive 
perspectives of resilience which now dominate research overlook this pejorative definition and 
may limit theoretical progress by also overlooking possible ways systems cope with change.  
The idea that resilience might be both positive and negative is resurrected here to 
provide greater clarity and illustrative examples to two particular concepts of resilience important 
to infrastructure systems: robustness and extensibility. In particular, this paper describes how 
robustness and extensibility concepts guide different activities to maintain infrastructure services 
under stress while simultaneously being the reason infrastructure services may be lost. To 
establish a foundational theory of resilience that is broadly generalizable, resilience research 
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must realize the differences between concepts that only become clear when discussing both their 
desirable and undesirable qualities [56]. In our view, resilience research must shift from 
identifying which concept is superior to identifying use of both in practice and how to facilitate 
switching between them when needed. In this paper, we expound upon robustness and 
extensibility and draw upon examples in electric power, water management, and transportation 
systems to illustrate their positive and negative implications for infrastructure management and 
crisis response. 
Risk and Resilience in Infrastructure Systems 
Improving the resilience of infrastructure systems is meant to protect them from 
unforeseen and unknown threats, yet confusion remains over what resilient infrastructure is. 
“Resilience” entered the civil protection lexicon through materials science, medicine, psychology, 
social science, and ecology and has recently become a popular word describing the ability of 
infrastructure components and systems to handle adversity [4], [57], [58]. In the context of 
infrastructure, resilience is generally associated with the design of built systems and actions that 
ensure the provision of services like mobility, energy, and water when faced with threats [11], 
[13]. Even with broad consensus on the need to maintain the structure and function of built 
systems, literature reviews seeking to condense the growing number of research articles into 
specific definitions, metrics, methods, and applications continue to produce conflicting views. 
Resilience is often likened to divergent concepts like risk [4], [59], reliability [60], sustainability 
[61], adaptive capacity [62], and transformation [32]. Confusion is further amplified as numerous 
research articles and policy documents from influential organizations discuss infrastructure 
resilience (e.g. [63]) or use resilience in their title (e.g., [64]) but fail to be informed by a mature 
theoretical understanding of resilience that can be broadly applied. 
Part of the reason that resilience is so difficult to apply in infrastructure systems is that 
the word itself occupies an awkward position in the English language. Although “resilience” is 
used as a noun, the most popular definitions describe it as a capacity to act – which makes 
resilience an action or property that systems perform, like a verb, rather than a property that a 
system has, like a noun. Table 5 compares different forms of the words “risk” and “resilience” to 
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further illustrate this point. While both risk and resilience work well as abstract nouns, only risk 
works as a quantifiable noun. This may explain some of the difficulty that researchers have 
coming up with quantifiable, concrete measures of resilience for infrastructure. On the other hand, 
the action verb form of risk is a poor choice, whereas the word resile, although obscure, is 
nonetheless proper and useful. Risk works well as a linking or helping verb, but resile does not. 
The ways in which we can use these words in English creates constraints around the ways we 
think about them for infrastructure design and management. We can see that both risk and 
resilience can be used in noun and verb forms, but that risk works better as an objective, 
quantifiable noun and helping verb, whereas resilience works better as an action verb. We should 
think of infrastructure resilience not just in the capacity to act, but in the action itself. 
Consequentially, the tools and methods for measuring and addressing infrastructure risks are not 
appropriate for resilience, as these two related concepts are fundamentally different. 
Table 5 Comparison of the Noun and Verb Forms of Risk and Resilience. 
 
 
Note: Green and red colors emphasize grammatically correct and incorrect sentences, 
respectively. 
 
Infrastructure resilience as a verb endorses designing built systems with beneficial 
properties such as diversity [65] or efficiency [66] to maintain service provision, as well as 
systems that have the capacity to switch between these properties. Major resilience research 
efforts across disciplines promote the need for an array of beneficial system properties that 
influence infrastructure failure response (see [67] for a more comprehensive list of properties). 
However, designing built systems with beneficial qualities like efficient failure response systems is 
Part of Speech Risk Resilience 
Abstract Noun What is risk? What is resilience? 
Concrete / 
Quantifiable Noun 
What is a risk? What is a resilience? 
Action Verb I risked. I resiled. 
Linking Verb I risk floods. I resile floods. 
Helping Verb I risk flooding. I resile flooding. 
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often in conflict with increasing the diversity of response options, as too many different 
technologies or decision-makers may inhibit timely crisis response [68]. In contrast, efficient 
systems may fail in unknown and unforeseen situations that require a diversity of failure response 
options to maintain service provision [66]. Neither approach is perfect nor resilient. That is, 
resilience would neither be found in infrastructure systems that emphasize efficiency nor diversity, 
but rather in systems with a capacity to deploy efficiency in some scenarios and diversity in 
others. We refer to the act of designing infrastructure systems to have some combination of 
efficient, diverse, or otherwise beneficial properties as pursuing different resilience strategies. The 
shift from focusing on system properties to resilience strategies is important because any single 
strategy can help maintain a continuity of needs in the present, but if practiced forever may 
eventually fail. A theory of resilience therefore cannot promise complete protection of built 
systems and services against all adverse events, but it could reveal the benefits and limitations of 
different adaptive strategies in practice. The verb resile in this context refers to need to switch 
between strategies when current practices are found to be impractical or dangerous, e.g., when 
efficiency trumps diversity, or vice versa. 
Concepts of Resilience for Infrastructure Systems 
We build upon work in the subdiscipline of “resilience engineering” to realize how 
different resilience strategies may be implemented in infrastructure systems. Resilience 
engineering has a large and growing body of literature with roots in system safety and 
organizational theory relevant to the design and management of infrastructure [5], [69]. In 
general, authors within the subdiscipline share consistent views of resilience as an action 
systems do, rather than a property they have (e.g., [44], [45], [70]). Still, the subdiscipline has 
more than three decades of development and debate that contrast different strategies to engineer 
systems to handle unknown and unforeseen events [24], [71], [72]. Recently, four concepts of 
resilience extant in the literature were distinguished that can form the basis for resilience 
strategies in infrastructure systems [5], [73]: 
 Resilience as rebound – to return to normal activities after traumatic events. 
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 Resilience as robustness – to manage increasing stressors, complexity, and challenges 
with limited to no impact on normal activities. 
 Resilience as graceful extensibility – to extend existing system performance when 
surprise events challenge current capabilities. 
 Resilience as sustained adaptability – to manage trade-offs and build adaptive capacity 
to continuously evolving contexts. 
 
Given this pluralistic view, each concept reflects a distinct strategy to maintain the 
structure and function of built systems tailored to a specific stress context. That is, no single 
concept is appropriate for all stress conditions, and each concept may be more or less desirable 
when applied in practice. Still, previous work only delineates theoretical differences between 
concepts rather than discussing which stress contexts they manage or how to implement them in 
infrastructure. Here, we demarcate the stress contexts that robustness and extensibility manage 
and identify the ways to implement each strategy in electric power, transportation, and water 
management systems. We focus on robustness and extensibility because both concepts 
emphasize adaptive actions to maintain service provision, rather than return systems to a 
previous state or evolve to changing contexts. Thus, both are comparable in practice, and their 
clarification can inform broad understandings of infrastructure resilience. 
Robustness as a Resilience Strategy 
Robustness as a resilience strategy emphasizes active buffering and dynamic 
reallocation of resources in response to known hazards and in accordance with explicit protocols, 
policies, or procedures, while accepting the inevitability that surprises may lead to catastrophic 
losses. For example, highway rules sometimes allow travel in shoulder lanes during periods of 
peak travel or inclement weather, called “hard shoulder running” [74], [75]. Under ordinary 
conditions travel in the roadway shoulder would be prohibited, with the space at the side of the 
road reserved for emergency and broken-down vehicles. However, during times expected to be 
peak travel periods, some rules designate the shoulders for travel, increasing the capacity of the 
roadway and mitigating the likelihood of traffic jams. While this policy is adaptive in the sense that 
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it deploys the capacity of the roadway shoulder only when the normal travel lanes would be 
overwhelmed, this dynamic reallocation of resources also leaves the highway system vulnerable 
to massive congestion. Without a shoulder, crashes or breakdowns will cause even greater 
impacts to traffic given that response vehicles (e.g., police, tow trucks) will be delayed without a 
clear path by which to reach the site of the emergency. 
Robustness is often the adaptive strategy employed when infrastructure designers and 
managers are able to correctly forecast known adverse events and establish automatic sensory 
and control systems to dynamically reallocate resources. The need for a continuity of services in 
infrastructure systems suggests that any loss of structure or function must be avoided. 
Robustness epitomizes fault or disruption prevention by designing well-controlled systems which 
avert known dangers via calculated precision, accuracy, and repeatability. We delineate robust 
systems from others as those that avert known “faults” or “disruptions”. Robustness requires that 
threats must be recognized and designed for prior to their onset to ensure infrastructure services 
remain available. In other words, robust systems only prevent perturbations that are known a 
priori, and avert losses to these anticipated stressors by established IF...THEN contingencies in 
such a way that service users never experience a change in quality or access.  
Still, pursuing robustness exclusively for infrastructure protection will never ensure a continuity of 
services to all hazards. It emphasizes threat identification as the first and foremost step prior to 
any design actions.  Nonetheless, any attempt to prevent one type of failure may increase the 
likelihood and damages experienced from others [76]. When robustness fails, it typically is 
because reallocation of resources results in sudden and catastrophic collapse when system loads 
become overwhelming, or the system encounters unexpected stressors for which no contingency 
exists.  
Recent controversies involving United Airlines treatment of passengers exemplified a 
robustness failure (April, 2017). In one instance, United was criticized for refusing to board 
passengers that were, in the opinion of the gate agents, improperly dressed to fly on 
complementary tickets reserved for company friends and family. Airline officials defended the 
decision of the gate agents by saying they were acting in accordance with United policies that 
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require friends and family be held to higher dress code standards than paid passengers. 
However, just a few weeks later the airline found itself the target of public outcry for forcibly 
dragging a paid passenger from an overbooked plane [77]. Again, officials defended the actions 
of the flight and ground crews as consistent with airline policies and protocols. Only later did the 
CEO admit that the company failed to communicate to front line employees that they could 
exercise discretion in the enforcement of those policies, rather than resort to excessive force. 
These examples demonstrate that customer service policies work well for known situations, yet 
these same policies may exacerbate situations for which they were not developed. 
Designing Robust Infrastructure Systems 
One of the advantages of robustness strategies is that they lend themselves to automatic 
control systems. Thus, robustness might be best achieved by technologies in isolation, rather 
than humans in isolation. For example, at complex roadway intersections, it is becoming more 
common to deploy cameras and other traffic sensors that feed information to automated control 
algorithms and adjust signal timings to reallocate green lights to the lanes or turns that are in 
greatest demand. Because the stressors and remedies are pre-programmed, they can be 
implemented immediately without the additional cost of human intervention. However, under 
unusual traffic conditions such as a crash site, a temporary closure for a special event, or a 
special procession, it is still common to employ human police to override automated control 
systems.  
Even when using linear models and simple equations, calculating the flow of resources 
like electricity, water, data, and traffic is a demanding task. The most effective robust designs 
consider all aspects of future hazards and system dynamics, including how system losses 
propagate in many different operational scenarios. Computers can complete these tasks 
flawlessly in fractions of time. This characteristic difference in precision and throughput between 
technology and people can be further expanded to suggest that technology will outperform people 
when completing any complex task with explicit rules such as driving [78] and games like Go [79]. 
Each of these systems epitomizes robustness by averting anticipated hazards through well-
defined tasks and by experiencing difficulty when managing situations with ill-defined rules. 
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Because technologies have the throughput and precision to ensure robustness and lack the 
fallibility of humans in well-defined scenarios, robustness is largely a technological hazard 
prevention strategy,  
Although computerized systems epitomize robust operations, robust approaches to 
resilience can also be carried out by people when conforming to prescribed responses to known 
threats. For example, generation-load dispatch in power grids can be optimized to reduce the 
probability of losses to unusual weather, rare and novel threats like geomagnetic disturbances 
[80], and hurricanes [81]. To realize these adaptive actions, sensor information is used to update 
operational protocols and reliable human responses. Robustness enhancing policies include N-k 
reliability standards that require operations of N interconnected infrastructures to survive k 
failures without reduction in service constraints. The standard for electric power grids is N-1 
reliability [82], where systems are designed to continue functioning after the loss of any single 
infrastructure, but is not necessarily guaranteed for a larger number of failures. Similar thresholds 
exist in infrastructure operations, including limits on the number of system errors allowed to occur 
and their impact on customer access to services [83]. Thus, robustness requires explicit 
contingency policies that demand reliable human actions. 
Tradeoffs of Pursuing Robustness in Infrastructure Systems 
Robustness has limitations for managing inconceivable threats that may prove 
disastrous. Improving a system to handle a known threat can increase the likelihood that other 
threats will cause greater damages, as has been demonstrated in control theory [76].This tradeoff 
exists when implementing any of the adaptive robustness strategies described above in 
infrastructure systems – redesigning the interactions among built components, changing 
operational methods, and developing regulatory thresholds for ordinary operations – where 
tradeoffs exist even among robustness strategies themselves. In complex systems, this is 
referred to as the conservation of fragility [76], [84] and is most pronounced in systems highly 
optimized to few, specific threats. The more robustness is pursued to increase the resilience of 
infrastructure, the greater the risk that catastrophic failures can occur from unforeseen events.  
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In some cases, robust contingency plans remain underdeveloped because rare events 
are misunderstood as inconceivable – even when they are well within the imagination of 
infrastructure operators and managers. The near-breaching of the Oroville Dam in California 
serves an important case of imagined catastrophes being realized. In 2005, several 
environmental groups expressed concern that allowing high water levels to overtop a secondary 
(i.e., emergency) spillway may cause significant damage to the dam, surrounding power plants, 
fisheries, communities, and waterways [85]. Although infrastructure managers refuted this vision 
by claiming the safety of the dam and reservoir control would not be compromised in the event of 
an emergency spillway discharge [86], a surge of rain and melting snow pack in February 2017 
combined with a structural failure of the main spillway overwhelmed the capacity of existing 
operating procedures to ensure the safety of downstream communities. The realization of events 
outside operational routine and thresholds demonstrate the potential drawbacks of robust 
infrastructure management [86]. 
Extensibility as a Resilience Strategy 
An extensible infrastructure system seeks the same outcome as a robust system, which 
is to prevent loss of services by protecting the system against hazards. However, extensible 
infrastructure systems achieve protection in a contradictory way to robustness – by defying rules 
and protocols rather than shoring them up. Events like Deepwater Horizon and the Fukushima 
Daiichi Meltdown were exacerbated into disasters by built systems working (and failing) in known 
ways and people following the rules to manage them [59]. Seminal works by Perrow [87] and 
Hollnagel et al. [44] argue that these events are caused by characteristically different stressors 
from faults or disruptions, called surprises, that cannot be anticipated a priori. However, even 
where hazards are pre-conceived, contingencies plans will fail in the face of complexity, as a 
sufficient number of simultaneous disruptions, feedback loops, or maladaptive responses can 
result in  “normal accidents” [87] that amplify consequences beyond any previous expectations. 
Following the rules and norms established for the operation and management of these cascading, 
unforeseen scenarios may only exacerbate damages [88]. In these cases, extensibility is needed 
to break established systems, norms, rules, or expectations to arrest failures. Thus, we define 
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extensibility in infrastructure systems as the adaptive modification of existing system structures 
and functions to prevent losses resulting from surprise. 
In contrast to the United Airlines example of robustness failure, the actions of Captain 
Sullivan in the case of US Airways 1549 after dual engine failure exemplify abandoning 
robustness in favor of extensibility (Jan, 2009). According to Capt. Sullivan’s testimony and after 
action findings, it was only by departing from established procedures that the pilots were able to 
land the plane in the Hudson river without a single loss of life [89]. While the crew was trained in 
emergency procedures for engine failure, these procedures assumed cruising altitude and never 
anticipated total loss of engine thrust at a low altitude so soon after takeoff. The resulting 
checklists for dual engine failure included many more checks than the pilots had time to complete 
prior to emergency landing [89]. In this event, following the explicit rules prior to ditching may 
have led to catastrophe by slowing decision-making processes. Instead, the pilots extended 
response protocols by skipping several recommended tasks and improvising a safe response. 
Designing Extensible Infrastructure Systems 
Extensibility requires that infrastructure systems have controls that can be turned on, shut 
down, modified, or moved to arrest surprising threats. These controls allow human discretion. For 
example, modern office buildings increasingly use motion detectors to control lights and faucets, 
thereby avoiding the waste associated with lighting unoccupied rooms or running water into 
empty sinks. However, almost all modern office occupants have experienced the frustration of 
having the automatic light switches turn off accidentally, or the frustration of waving their hands in 
front of an automatic faucet in an attempt to get running water. Manual light switches and faucets 
are the consumer analog of circuit breakers in power systems [90], activated floodways in 
streamflow management systems [4], and ad hoc communication networking devices [91]. 
Although these systems are sometimes used for normal infrastructure operations--e.g., in power 
distribution systems and roadway management-- they enable humans to respond to surprises by 
opening and closing paths for service flow, allowing infrastructure to function beyond designed 
thresholds, and switching on and off backup resources.  
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Extensibility is engineered into various infrastructure systems through the use of human-
in-the-loop systems that enable people to rearrange physical dependencies, system operation, 
and management processes. These systems are evident in control rooms where operators 
manipulate the structure and function of built systems. For example, all major factories and plants 
use supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) to collect and display real-time 
data on the function of working infrastructure (e.g., a turbine) and enable operators to modify 
infrastructure working conditions (e.g., is the turbine on or off). A common operator practice is to 
disregard information these systems display as SCADA systems are notorious for calculating and 
displaying unrealistic system errors [92], many of which are either benign, or if acted upon, would 
increase the possibility of a disruption to critical services . In response, operators must identify 
and ignore these errors, or in certain cases, actively generate them [83] to maintain continuous 
service provision. Assuming that there is no prescribed way in which SCADA errors are ignored 
or initiated, control room operators are practicing infrastructure extensibility by applying their own 
expert heuristics to unpredictable circumstances. 
Infrastructure policies that promote extensibility use imprecise language in support of 
context-specific implementation. Designing extensible infrastructure systems requires that people 
associated with infrastructure operations and management have the ability to influence and 
redirect service provision. While policies for robust solutions assign explicit thresholds and roles 
for infrastructure providers, extensible policies have “strategic ambiguity” [93] to empower people 
to act on their own volition. For example, military doctrine has now adopted the principal of 
“commander’s intent” that allow for ingenuity and adaptation in the field [94]. The commander’s 
intent gives high level, strategic direction, but remains ambiguous in the specific tactics or 
pathways that may be used to achieve the intent. Similarly, standards for developing and 
maintaining manufacturing robots utilize ambiguous language, using the term “justifiable trust” for 
the necessary amount of trust the technological system is meant to display to the human 
operators that work with them [95]. The ambiguous nature of this term is purposeful to force a 
broad interpretation of trust across many manufacturing industries and foster systems with 
flexible approaches to sociotechnical safety. This ambiguity supports extensibility by requiring 
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infrastructure providers to continuously manage shifting interpretations of trust across their 
respective industries similar to shifting international politics surrounding nuclear and cyber 
warfare [96]. 
Tradeoffs of Pursuing Extensibility in Infrastructure Systems 
Extending current infrastructure systems to handle surprises may also increase the risk 
that known disruptions become unmanageable through inefficient and distributed decision-making 
practices. Embedding people in infrastructure and creating human-in-the-loop, activated, and 
strategically ambiguous systems supports surprising responses to surprising events by not setting 
explicit rules. The greater the extensibility of an infrastructure system, the greater the risk that 
systems experience a brittle failure (i.e., sudden and cascading) because adaptive actions 
exhaust routine resources. When a system draws upon shared resources to practice extensibility, 
communication breakdowns can result in lack of coordination, working at cross-purposes, and 
loss of productivity such that existing resources are insufficient to keep pace with increasing 
demands.  
We refer to these processes collectively as “decompensation”: when a sociotechnical 
system exhausts its extensibility in a way that jeopardizes other hazard prevention activities [97]. 
An example of decompensation in infrastructure systems comes from roadway management. 
Deployable traffic control equipment can be used to create a detour around accidents for the 
safety of local drivers. While this detour exists, the use of equipment may increase the risk of a 
major traffic jam as other accidents and crisis situations cannot be detoured because traffic 
control equipment is already committed. In this example, the road system may experience a 
brittle failure (sudden, large traffic jam) as the routine activity (detour) is unavailable when 
extensible resources (traffic control equipment) are committed to other activities (working at cross 
purposes). 
Not all extensibility is “graceful”. Where decompensation results in a degradation of 
performance, a system may be extended in ways that management may fail to recognize – even 
in the face of overwhelming evidence. For example, evidence of decompensation can be found in 
“near misses” [98], when catastrophic failure was narrowly avoided through some human 
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ingenuity and adaptation. However, people may misinterpret the lesson from the near miss as 
evidence that they are more robust than they really are, rather than interpreting the near miss as 
evidence of decompensation. The ongoing water quality crisis in Flint, Michigan emphasizes the 
danger of overlooking near misses. In 2014, the decision for the City of Flint to change water 
sources from Detroit to the Flint River extended distribution systems to convey water with 
historically worse water quality [99]. Subsequent discovery of pathogens and corrosive chemicals 
in city water led to a series of boil water warnings and attempts by local residents to switch water 
sources again, this time away from the Flint River [100]. Attempts to change water sources were 
rebuked by government officials believing corrective actions taken by the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality to treat Flint River water were effective [101]. This failure to recognize 
decompensation exacerbated the initial extensibility of built systems to use a new water source 
and human actions to continually correct mounting issues. Eventually, the failure to act upon early 
issues regarding E coli and corrosion exposed residents to water with Legionnaires disease [99] 
and an unsafe concentration of lead [100].  
Decompensation is only possible when systems have extensibility. As humans are best 
at recognizing surprises and breaking the rules, the act of extending system capabilities is 
shaped by the same fallibility that makes people worse than computers at robustness. The 
example of control room operators ignoring SCADA errors emphasizes that “graceful” extensibility 
requires human agency and ingenuity during times of system stress to defy norms, procedures, 
and faults. As the operators form heuristics for managing SCADA errors, the system that was 
previously extensible can become decompensated to follow specific protocols. Keeping human-
in-the-loop operation ‘graceful’ requires learned heuristics to ensure operators retain the capacity 
to recognize and respond to surprises, even though these heuristics may be fallible. 
Preconditioned systems and optimization protocols do not allow for grace. Even the most 
sophisticated technological and artificial intelligence systems require explicit rules for making 
decisions that the algorithms themselves do not change.   
Robustness and Graceful Extensibility in Infrastructure Systems 
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Revisiting the discussion of models in Ch.2, the nature of infrastructure design is to 
create an expectation about the future (model) that enables decisions about technological and 
human system structures and functions. Inevitably, robust and extensible design expectations will 
be challenged by surprise. Some surprises may be situational, i.e., unlikely events that do not 
challenge previous model expectations, or fundamental, i.e., events that do challenge previous 
model expectations. Moreover, we could call positive surprises, such as accidental scientific or 
innovative discoveries, serendipity, whereas we could call negative surprises calamity. In either 
case, robustness and extensibility strategies fail when they do not enable infrastructure systems 
to adapt to surprise and ensure serendipity or calamity lead to positive outcomes. Because robust 
models must be built with anticipated thresholds in mind, robustness strategies requires that 
decision needs must exist prior to the model, as it is impossible to predict that which cannot be 
conceived of a priori. This means robust design and management strategies are best at 
managing situational surprises. Likewise, extensible design and management strategies require 
extending anticipated decision needs, and are best at managing fundamental surprise.  
Promoting use of either robustness or extensibility without an appreciation of its 
limitations overlooks an essential fact: surprise leads to negative outcomes when decision-
makers are stuck in stale models of risk management. Whether serendipitous or calamitous, 
surprises challenge our current models and understandings of systems. Yet, there are no 
guidelines for design, operation, and adaptation of infrastructure that explicitly addresses 
surprise. After crisis events that fundamentally surprise robust design and management 
strategies, many new infrastructure designs and retrofits are still based on previous approaches 
to engineering that value historical tolerances. Assuming no surprises occur in the near future, 
designs will become stale and persist well beyond their intended lifetime. Eventually a 
fundamental surprise will occur, infrastructure will fail, and no one, not even the most 
knowledgeable, will see it coming. 
A practical understanding of resilient infrastructure embraces both robustness and 
extensibility concepts. Although many agree that infrastructure resilience emphasizes the ability 
for systems to respond to crises, few agree on how to interpret and implement resilience in 
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practice. Instead, I recommend using a new approach to thinking about resilience that 
emphasizes the need to switch between strategies when the other becomes stale (Fig. 11). In 
brief, robustness strategies are employed when planning has identified contingencies and 
responses ahead of time to limit the negative outcomes of situational surprise. Extensibility 
strategies are employed when plans, models, and algorithms become stale, or when confronted 
with fundamental surprise. 
The need to switch between strategies is to ensure resilience models do not become 
state, because neither strategy works indefinitely. Robustness is challenged by situations that 
overwhelm predetermined thresholds, as seen in many disasters discussed above. Likewise, 
extensibility can fail and cause large-scale infrastructure disruptions when independent systems 
Figure 11 Relationship Between Robustness and Extensibility Strategies.  
Robustness and extensibility are two strategies used to help infrastructure systems 
manage disruptions. Robustness strategies are best at managing situation 
surprises, and where they fail, improvisational strategies of extensibility are required 
to succeed (represented by the red circle). Likewise, there are benefits gained from 
switching strategies (represented by the green circle) when serendipity enables new 
robust and extensible capabilities. Infrastructure resilience is not one strategy or 
another, but the ability to change strategies in response to changing stressors and 
organizational state 
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are working at cross purposes or events require more efficient use of limited resources. True 
resilience is being able implement the proper strategy for a given situation, i.e., shore up 
resources into strict plans sometimes, and improvise to handle overwhelmed events in other 
situations. Failure occurs when the strategy used does not match stress conditions experienced. 
Infrastructure managers need guidance on when shifting between strategies is necessary to 
avoid large-scale disruptions. 
This means resilience is not a state property, like vulnerability, which can be enhanced 
through careful investment in system hardening or failure response. Instead, resilience is a set of 
processes, best understood as an action (verb) a system performs, rather than a characteristic 
(noun) a system has. Thus, resilience is found neither in isolated, nor interdependent 
infrastructure systems, neither hierarchical, nor egalitarian command structures for emergency 
response, and neither cohesive, nor individualistic communities. Rather, resilience is the ability 
for built systems to reconfigure themselves between isolated and interdependent modes, for 
organizations to change command structures, and for communities modify relationships to match 
stress conditions. Similarly, there is no single systems or mental model that is superior for 
resilience. Rather, resilience is the capacity to change between models as circumstances 
warrant. 
This understanding of resilience from a robustness and extensibility perspective is 
important to distinguish from other system design concepts that such as flexibility and agility (or 
otherwise). Flexibility and agility themselves are easily conflated, as only the recent work of 
Sherehiy et al. [102], Santos Bernardes & Hanna [103], and Alberts et al [104], [105] provide 
nested frameworks for understanding the distinction between flexibility and agility, and Chester & 
Allenby [106] describe how flexibility and agility relate to infrastructure systems. Across all 
authors, flexibility is treated as an inherent infrastructure system property, defined as the 
characteristics of system components to change status within an existing configuration. Flexibility 
is designed into infrastructure systems by using technologies and management protocols that 
function together (compatible), communicate to each other (connectable), and are easy to add, 
modify, or remove from the system (modular). In contrast, agility is a system-level organizing 
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paradigm that enables an infrastructure system to rapidly reconfigure to new operating 
parameters. Thus, a resilient infrastructure system needs both flexibility and agility in 
technological and social sub-systems to adapt current designs to new configurations. While each 
of these capabilities may enable robust or extensible resilience strategies, neither flexibility nor 
agility take into account the implications of using automated or human means achieve desired 
outcomes, or whether design decisions handle situational or fundamental surprises. It is entirely 
possible to have a flexible and agile system that is fully automated and/or at full discretion of 
people, but each system will fail in different characteristic stress contexts. The first system will be 
brittle when design thresholds are exceeded, and the second will brittle when decompensation 
threatens service provision. Resilience supersedes these concepts to include the inherent 
limitations of different flexibility and agility design options, and categorizes these concepts within 
robustness and extensibility strategies. 
In particular, resilience demands better heuristics for knowing when and how to change 
our system models and establish new parameter sets, and recent advancements in the theory of 
resilience have revealed some important insights in how to organize our thinking [5], [73], [107]. 
In particular, several processes that must be mastered by any organization that seeks to consider 
itself resilient. In Ch. 2, we discuss these processes as monitoring, responding, learning, and 
anticipating [44], [45]. Further development of these processes also consider sensing and 
adapting [4], [5]. Each of these process has technological and organizational functions. For 
example, in sensing, data may come in quantitative forms – such as the weather radar or stream 
elevation gauges. But it may also come in qualitative forms, such as anecdotes, images, or even 
body language. Similarly, adapting could come in technical forms, such as automated controls or 
contingency plans and in organizational forms, such as reallocation of decision rights, changes in 
access to information, or patterns and policies or interaction. 
Robustness and Extensibility in Power, Transport, and Water Systems 
We compare robustness and graceful extensibility as distinct concepts based on at least 
three criteria for infrastructure systems: threat perception, failure response, and implementation 
strategies. Pursuing robustness requires threat identification as a first step, and is most 
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appropriate for managing frequent threats with which operators have prior experience or historical 
data. By contrast, graceful extensibility requires the treatment of threats as surprises and is more 
appropriate for unprecedented events. The strategies themselves become less and less useful 
when misapplied, such that robust systems fail under surprise and extensibility fails under 
decompensation. Although both strategies are pursued in distinct ways, by emphasizing different 
approaches to future threats, they may complement each other in practice.  
Robust strategies defer decision-making to pre-determined contingency plans and 
protocols with strict rules for decision-making, information sharing, and action. Failure to have, 
know, and follow known protocols will quickly lead to loss of services. In contrast, extensible 
systems are successful in unconstrained, imagined situations that require improvisation to try new 
ideas. Risk of system failure increases as decompensation limits response options and available 
extensibility is wasted, unbeknownst to infrastructure providers. As systems become 
decompensated, people are forced to extend systems without regard to how improvised activities 
further decompensate them. Decompensation can overwhelm extensible systems, just surprises 
may overwhelm robust systems. 
Some infrastructure designs already embrace the capacity to be robust and extensible, 
such as switching between manual and autopilot systems in commercial planes during flight. 
Autopilot is a robust solution to safe flight, making it unable to handle surprising threats. Humans 
can overtake automated systems at any given time, increasing the extensibility of current 
systems. This is standard in situations where constant training is needed or surprises are 
common, such as take-off and landing. Still, the moments in which the aircraft is controlled 
entirely by the pilot are susceptible to decompensation. 
Robustness and extensibility in infrastructure systems require distinct implementation 
strategies. Summarized in Tables 6 and 7 is a non-exhaustive list of ways in which both 
strategies can be implemented in infrastructure systems with specific examples for electric power, 
transportation, and water systems. This list is based upon well-known approaches used by 
infrastructure designers, operators, and managers to maintain the structure and function of built 
systems and provides a new organization of these strategies based on robustness and 
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extensibility. Rows within the tables compare robustness and extensibility strategies across 
different infrastructure systems. For example, manual switchgear in power systems offers 
equivalent control over power flow as deployable traffic equipment in roadways and activated 
floodways in flood control systems (Table 7). Cells across Tables 7 and 8 offer comparison 
between robustness and extensibility strategies in practice. For example, using automated flow 
regulating devices is a robustness strategy to flood management that is built directly into the 
water infrastructure system (Table 6). Likewise, activated floodways that must be opened or 
destroyed to control floodwaters could be extensible infrastructures built into the system wherever 
operating rules require expert judgment for their actuation. Both flood control infrastructures 
provide the same services, but in characteristically different ways.  
Across all three infrastructure systems common methods for automating systems exist, 
including computer controlled services to protect infrastructure and users like self-islanding 
microgrids and self-driving cars. Robust human responses are supported by strict operations and 
maintenance expectations like vegetation management and material specifications. Moreover, 
policies and standards support robustness by further defining normal operations through strict 
reliability criteria and regulatory requirements. 
Graceful extensibility can also be designed into the technological and human systems 
that make up infrastructure, yet appear as different kinds of human-in-the-loop design through 
activated systems and strategically ambiguous policies. Common activated infrastructures include 
circuit breakers and floodways and deployable technologies like power conditioning batteries, 
bridge retrofits, floodwalls, and sandbags. Assuming sensor networks and infrastructures are 
feeding human decisions rather than automated systems, the move to smart grid, transportation, 
and water infrastructure may be increasing the capacity of people to take improvisational actions 
and make graceful decisions. Finally, strategically ambiguous operational protocols and policies 
support heuristic response by giving autonomy to infrastructure providers. Some reliability indices 
used across infrastructure systems like SAIDI enable this form of autonomy among power 
providers. Similar autonomy is gained in US transportation systems through different enforcement 
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policies across city and state lines for equivalent laws (e.g., speed limits and ticketing 
expectations).  
None of the strategies in Table 6 for designing robust built systems, operational 
protocols, and/or policies preclude those in Table 7 for gracefully extensible systems. In other 
words, infrastructure systems can and are designed to have a redundancy of options that support 
both robust and extensible hazard prevention strategies. One example would be an activated 
infrastructure that has both automatic systems to prevent known failures and human activated 
systems to enable extensibility such as some microgrids in power systems that have automatic 
and on-site control systems. However, few infrastructure components or systems are designed 
for this form of optionality, making it difficult to fund redundancy among strategies. In current 
infrastructure operations and management environments with limited time and money, 
infrastructure providers will be faced with choosing to employ one strategy or the other. 
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Table 6 Robust Infrastructure Implementation Strategies 
Implementation and 
Design 
Electric Power1 Transportation2 Water3 
Built System Automating  Automatic circuit 
reconfiguration 
 Self-islanding 
microgrids 
 Intelligent 
transportation 
systems 
 Automated 
signaling 
systems 
 Self-driving 
cars 
 Flow regulating 
devices 
 Remote water 
quality 
monitoring 
system 
Infrastructure 
Operations 
Explicit 
Protocols 
 Operator training 
to follow strict 
protocols 
 Vegetation 
management 
 Managed 
lanes 
 Infrastructure 
materials 
specifications 
 Maintenance 
and 
development 
policies 
 
 Dam discharge 
and flood 
warning 
protocols 
 Inspection, 
maintenance, 
and 
enforcement 
programs to 
ensure 
continued 
function of dams 
and levees 
 Emergency 
water supply 
plans (e.g.,  for 
health care 
facilities) 
Policies and 
Standards 
Operational 
Thresholds 
 N-1 reliability 
criteria 
 Minimum 
generation 
reserve margins 
 Frequency and 
stability limits 
 
 Return period 
for 
infrastructure 
design 
 Insurance and 
tax limitations 
 
 Hydrographs for 
design storms 
 Floodplain 
management 
ordinance (e.g., 
elevation 
certificates, 
flood insurance) 
 Fire flow rules 
for water 
distribution 
systems 
Note: sources for table contents – 1[108],  2[63], [109], [110], and 3[4], [111]–[114] 
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Table 7 Extensible Infrastructure Implementation Strategies 
Implementation and Design Electric Power1 Transportation2 Water3 
Built System Activated 
Infrastructure 
 Manual 
switchgear and 
circuit breakers 
 Utility scale 
batteries for 
power 
conditioning 
 Modular 
construction 
techniques 
 Deployable 
retrofits 
 Deployable 
traffic 
management 
infrastructures 
 Activated floodways 
 Detention/retention 
basin parks 
 Dam spillways 
 Water shut-
off/isolation valves in 
distribution systems 
 Connecting 
alternative water 
source to the building 
plumbing 
 
 Human-in-the-
Loop Design 
 Demand 
response 
 Household 
distributed 
energy 
resources (solar 
panels and wind 
turbines) 
 Non-automated 
microgrids (on-
site 
management) 
 Human 
drivers, 
pilots, and 
captains of 
vehicles 
 Roundabout
s 
 Clearing garbage or 
sediment build-up in 
stormwater drains 
 Self-assessment 
guide for drinking 
water 
 Arranging with 
another public water 
supply to obtain 
potable water (e.g., 
water delivery trucks) 
Infrastructure 
Operations 
Strategic 
Ambiguity 
 Operator training 
without explicit 
protocols and 
expectations 
 Intersections 
and lanes 
managed by 
traffic officers  
 
 Implementing 
damage reduction 
measures for existing 
buildings such as 
acquisition, 
relocation, retrofitting, 
and maintenance of 
drainage ways and 
retention basins  
 Human-in-the-
Loop Design 
 Smart grid 
systems and 
software for 
situational 
awareness 
 
 Smart traffic 
sensors and 
SCADA 
systems 
 Real-time 
traffic and 
route 
management 
 
Policies and 
Standards 
Strategic 
Ambiguity 
 System 
interruption and 
availability 
indices without 
explicit 
thresholds (e.g., 
SAIDI) 
 Enforcement 
of speed limits 
and traffic laws 
 
 Low Impact 
Development 
practices 
Note: sources for table contents – 1[108][108] , 2[109], [115]–[117][109], [115]–[117] , and 3[4], 
[65], [112]–[114] 
  
  58 
Conclusion 
For robustness and extensibility to be different resilience concepts, there must exist different 
characteristic stress contexts that impact infrastructure services. We categorize these based on 
the stressors each resilience concept handles best – robustness prevents losses to known 
disruptions and faults, where graceful extensibility prevents losses to surprises.  Many of the 
differences between resilience strategies in practice come from the initial conceptualization of 
system stressors, and infrastructure solutions tend to follow choice of stress context. A focus on 
calculated, detailed faults and disruptions emphasizes automated, robust solutions. In contrast, a 
focus on complex, systemic interactions that generate surprising responses will emphasize 
extensible solutions to embed decision-makers and ways to rearrange systems on the fly. 
Following that multiple stress contexts exist, there is a need for both robust and 
extensible systems to manage the stressors that threaten infrastructure systems. Neither pre-
defined rules nor ambiguous policies manage all stress contexts, and a blend of both approaches 
will be necessary to protect infrastructure systems. Pursuing resilience as a verb in infrastructure 
systems cannot endorse automated nor human controlled systems alone, but suggests that 
strategies that bridge them may handle a large number of stress contexts. Consequently, where a 
single concept of resilience dominates governance of infrastructure systems, more of that single 
concept may have counterproductive effects.  Based on this work, resilient strategies must be 
shared between the robustness provided primarily by technologies and the extensibility provided 
primarily by human expert ingenuity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIOTECHNICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR POWER GRID RESILIENCE  
IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
This chapter is published in the journal Complexity for the special issue on Energy and 
Complexity and appears as submitted prior to final proofs. The citation for this article is: 
Eisenberg, D.A., Park, J., Seager, T.P. (2017) Sociotechnical Network Analysis for Power Grid 
Resilience in South Korea. Complexity, 2017, 1-14. doi:10.1155/2017/3597010. 
 
Introduction 
The increasing frequency and costs of catastrophic events has prompted concerted 
international efforts to study and design more resilient power systems. In the United States, 
national policy is encouraging technical efforts to improve the resilience of infrastructure systems, 
including: energy, water, cyber security, communications, transportation, emergency 
management, healthcare, financial, and government systems [2], [118]. Global organizations like 
the United Nations [119] and Rockefeller Foundation [120] promote similar goals across partner 
nations to establish resilient cities to future catastrophes. In all cases, the resilience of electric 
power systems receive particular interest, as electricity is essential to the provision of nearly all 
other infrastructure services. Power grid resilience research now produces a constant stream of 
novel analytical techniques to predict and reduce systemic losses associated with infrastructure 
failures, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks [31], [121], [122]. Despite these efforts, even the 
most modern power grids continue to experience large-scale blackouts. Countries like the US 
[123], India [124], Ukraine [125], and Australia [126] suffered major brownouts and blackouts 
between 2011 and 2016 from a broad range of events from extreme weather to cyberattack.  
We argue the lack of resilience in critical infrastructure is, in part, due to overemphasizing 
technological solutions that underestimate crisis decision-making and social context [127]–[130]. 
Currently, power system protection focuses on hardening existing system components and 
designing automated, redundant, smart, or otherwise technological solutions to reduce the 
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probability of losses [128], [129]. However, reducing the probability of losses via technological 
solutions alone does not reduce their consequences (i.e., outcome of emergencies), which is 
dictated by human actions. For example, the 2003 US Northeast blackout included a combination 
of infrastructure, control system, and decision-making failures that exacerbated unstable 
conditions and led to cascading damages [131]. Since 2003, post-mortem analysis of several 
major blackout events continue to recommend improved communication within and across 
organizations to enhance crisis response [127], [132], [133]. Thus, research should expand 
awareness beyond technological limitations to include the diverse institutions that influence 
human decision-making and failure consequences, such as operations and management 
practices, economic constraints, organizational and industry cultures, and affected parties. We 
refer to the joint consideration of technological systems with these and other social institutions 
hereafter as “sociotechnical” analysis [134].    
Network science enables one to model the components and interactions of human and 
infrastructure systems [135], suggesting the potential to develop a sociotechnical network 
analysis (STNA) for infrastructure resilience. Both electric power grids and human interactions are 
now studied as networks, yet isolated research does not treat engineering and social science 
perspectives as equals for sociotechnical guidance. The term “sociotechnical” is primarily used in 
network science to describe the study of human processes organized or mediated by technology, 
such as the formation of online social networks like Facebook and Twitter [136], traffic flows on 
transportation systems [137], or human interactions on communication networks [138]–[140]. 
Instead, we use the term STNA to describe the application of sociotechnical systems theory [19] 
to technological and human networks coupled by a single context. The tenets of sociotechnical 
systems theory can be translated into infrastructure network models by analyzing both social and 
technological networks together to avoid unpredictable and harmful recommendations from 
narrow perspectives on a single system [62], and by considering the tasks taken by social units 
and the expected function of technological systems alongside network structure [32]. A STNA of 
blackout management, thus, requires both infrastructure networks of substations, generators, 
transmission lines, and transformers as nodes and links [141] alongside social networks of 
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human constructs like actors and their relational ties (e.g., who knows whom) [142], not one or 
the other. A STNA also requires knowledge of how power systems provide electric power 
services and the tasks people and organizations take to ensure services remain available. We 
argue that this form of STNA better supports the design of resilient power grids than those extant 
in the literature by integrating knowledge from engineering and social science without 
marginalizing either. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this form of STNA is also novel as no 
network studies in the literature give built and human systems equal consideration.  
In this work, we develop the first STNA of a power grid to improve blackout response. We 
construct corresponding infrastructure and social networks and study them to identify critical 
components. We use results from power grid analysis in a new way by converting knowledge of 
critical infrastructure into demographic data of the organizations that manage their failures when 
lost. We further combine these results with a social network analysis of the formal institutions that 
dictate crisis coordination during large-scale blackouts [143]–[145]. The social network analysis 
reveals important organizations that fulfill coordination roles among them. Together, these 
analyses uncover which organizations are critical to power system protection from both 
engineering and administrative perspectives, and can offer ways to improve blackout 
management policies that either analysis is incapable of offering its own. 
Due to the significant amount of context-specific data required for STNA, this work 
centers on a single case study location: the South Korean power grid (KPG). In 2011, the worst 
brownout experienced in Korea caused roughly half of Seoul to lose power and was exacerbated 
by slowed decision-making processes across operator and regulatory agencies [146]. In 2013, 
corruption among regulatory officials lead to nationwide power shortages after components in 
Korean nuclear power plants were found to have forged reliability documentation [147]. In 2014, 
the national tragedy of a ferry capsizing and killing 295 people (mostly children) [148] triggered 
the reorganization of the entire Korean emergency management industry to centralize crisis 
coordination efforts into a single agency [149]. In 2016 a city-wide blackout in Jeonggwan New 
City was exacerbated by a failure to deploy backup infrastructure stored on the other side of the 
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country. Taken together, a case study of the KPG will have broad impacts on Korean society as 
the South Korean grid in need of social and technological guidance for blackout response. 
Background on Korean Electric Power and Emergency Management Industries 
The KPG is an islanded power system which has two primary parts, a large mainland grid 
serving the majority of Korea and a smaller, self-contained grid on the island state of Jeju-Do. In 
this work, we focus on the mainland KPG. The mainland grid has voltage classes from 765 kV to 
as low as 3.3 kV, yet ~55.1% of substation and 96% of power line infrastructure is either 345 and 
154 kV (Fig. 12) [150]. The 345 and 154 kV transmission infrastructure are geographically 
clustered in population-dense regions such as the Seoul Metropolitan Area in the Northwest. 
Korean power generation is dominated by coal, natural gas, and nuclear power technologies, and 
 
Figure 12 Map of the 2013 
South Korean Power Grid. 
This map shows the 
connectivity of major power 
grid infrastructure in 
mainland Korea, i.e., power 
plants (red circles), high-
voltage transmission 
substations (dark blue 
circles), and power lines 
(dark blue lines). 
Transformers connect 
buses that are too close 
together to be shown in this 
image. For security 
purposes data is simplified 
to only publicly available 
data from the Korean Power 
Exchange [204]. Jeju Island 
off the southern coast of 
Korea is also excluded from 
the image because it is not 
considered in the current 
analysis. 
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this power production is geographically centralized, where roughly 95% of installed capacity is 
located in 55 separate sites throughout the county [151]. 
KPG infrastructure is owned and operated by a few, key organizations (Table 8). Korean 
power transmission and distribution is managed by a single company, the Korea Power 
Exchange (KPX) and infrastructure ownership and maintenance is dominated by a separate 
company, the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). During crises, KPX and KEPCO act 
as focal points for grid status, health, and management across the nation – KPX managing power 
flow and operations decisions and KEPCO managing power line and infrastructure recovery. 
KEPCO has 6 generation subsidiaries that independently operate and manage ~97% of Korean 
grid [152]. Liquid fuel, natural gas, and coal-fired power plants are owned and operated by 5 of 
the 6 generation subsidiaries, each with roughly the same total generation capacity – 10-15 GW. 
The single largest generation subsidiary (~20 GW) is Korea’s sole owner and operator of all 
nuclear power plants, Korea Hydro Nuclear Power (KHNP). Besides nuclear and fossil fuel 
generation, ~7% of electricity is generated from hydroelectric and renewable sources. KHNP and 
other KEPCO subsidiaries operate single purpose dams (power generation) whereas the Korean 
Water Administration (Kwater) manages all Korean multi-purpose dams (power, water supply, 
and flood control). 
Korean blackout response requires the coordination of electric power regulators (Table 8) 
and emergency managers for decision-making and crisis support (Table 9). KPX is the 
established hub for minor blackout incidents. Ministries and support organizations provide 
additional oversight in larger events depending upon the type of generation technologies involved 
(Table 8). For major fires, typhoons, earthquakes, and terrorist attacks, the power industry 
coordinates with first-responder and emergency management organizations (fire fighters, police, 
and crisis mangers) to mitigate and recover failed infrastructure. Federal regulatory and crisis 
coordination agencies also become involved in decision-making in worst case scenarios where 
national power availability is deemed vulnerable. The Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy 
(MOTIE) is the acting headquarters for man-made disasters including infrastructure failure due to 
human error or intentional attack, and works with KPX and KEPCO to respond to national  
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Table 8 Electric Power Industry Organizations 
Operation & Management Regulation & Decision Making 
Power 
Transmission: 
Korea Electric Power 
Corp   
Industry-
wide: 
Ministry of 
Trade, Industry, 
and Energy 
 
Korean Power 
Exchange     
Korea Electricity 
Commission 
  
% Gen 
Capacity      
Thermoelectric 
Power: 
Korea Midland Power* 12.0%   
Sector 
Specific -- 
Nuclear: 
Nuclear Safety 
and Security 
Commission 
Korea Western Power*  10.6%   
Korea Institute 
of Nuclear 
Safety 
 
Korea East-West 
Power* 10.6%      
 Korea Southern Power* 9.6%   
Sector 
Specific -- 
Hydroelectric: 
Ministry of 
Land, 
Infrastructure, 
and Transport 
 
Korea Southeast 
Power* 9.6%   
Kum River 
Flood Control 
Office 
 POSCO Power 3.1%     
Youngsan River 
Flood Control 
Office 
 SK Energy 2.1%     
Nakdong River 
Flood Control 
Office 
 K-Power LTD 1.2%     
Han River Flood 
Control Office 
 
Korea District Heating 
Corp 1.2%      
 Meiya Power Company 1.2%      
 GS EPS 1.1%      
 Hyundai Corporation 1.1%      
        
Nuclear 
Power: 
Korea Hydro Nuclear 
Power* 29.0%      
        
Hydroelectric 
Power: 
Korea Water 
Administration 2.9%      
  Korea Hydro Nuclear 
Power* --   
    
 
*subsidiary of Korean Electric Power Corporation. Note: only companies with >1% of total 
generation capacity for Korea are listed. 
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Table 9 Disaster Management Industry Organizations 
Local Operations & Management Federal Operations & Management 
Crisis 
Operations 
-- State: 
Gyeonggi 
Firefighting & 
Disaster HQ 
Crisis 
Coordination: 
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry, and Energy 
Gangwon Fire HQ 
Ministry of Security and 
Public Administration 
 
Chungcheongbuk 
HQ of Fire Mgmt.   
National Emergency 
Management Agency 
 
Chungcheongnam 
Fire Safety Office    
 
Jeollabuk Fire Dept. 
HQ 
Oversight: 
Prime Minister's Office 
 
Jeollanam Fire 
Safety HQ 
  
National Security Office 
 
Gyeongsangbuk 
Fire Protection HQ    
 
Gyeongsangnam 
Fire Service HQ 
Additional 
Federal 
Support: 
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and 
Transport 
 
Jeju Fire & Disaster 
Mgmt. HQ* 
Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance 
    
Ministry of Employment 
and Labor  
Crisis 
Operations 
- City: 
Seoul Fire & 
Disaster HQ   
Ministry of Health and 
Wellness 
Busan Fire 
Department   Ministry of Defense 
 
Incheon Fire & 
Safety Mgmt. Dept.   National Police Agency 
 
Daejeon Fire 
Fighting Head 
Office   
Ministry of Culture, 
Sports, and Tourism 
 
Gwangju Fire Safety 
HQ   
Korean 
Communications 
Commission 
 
Daegu Fire Fighting 
HQ   
Korean Meteorological 
Agency 
  
Ulsan Fire & 
Disaster HQ     
 
*Jeju Island is not included in the current analysis. Note: based on 2013 data. 
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blackouts. MOTIE’s disaster management division works with the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA) and the Ministry of Security and Public Administration (MOSPA) to 
monitor and manage natural disasters. When MOTIE, NEMA, or MOSPA are involved in disaster 
management, MOTIE is the final decision-maker for built infrastructure and NEMA coordinates 
crisis support across a hierarchy of state and special city crisis headquarters to city, county, and 
district fire, police, and emergency management agencies. 
Our description of the KPG and related crisis management organizations is based on 
2013-2014 data collected from and verified by experts in formal interviews. We focus on this 
timeframe to ensure that power system analyses match with blackout management analyses. 
Since then, MOSPA and NEMA have become part of the same organization, the Ministry of 
Public Security and Safety (MPSS). Nonetheless, analysis of this blackout management system 
is a critical case relevant for many current policies and practices that remain intact, and all 
conclusions made in this work are applicable to the most recent organizational relationships. 
Materials and Methods 
Data for Network Analysis 
Power Grid Networks 
The KPG data was directly provided as a PSS/E (power system simulation for 
engineering) printout by KEPCO, and was converted into a complex network using methods 
similar to those described in Kim et al. [150]. We assessed the extracted KPG model with Matlab 
packages for optimal power flow [153] and complex network analysis [154], [155]. We use the 
Direct Current (DC) power flow approximation for all analyses [153]. Power flow analysis was 
calculated with the summer-time generation and demand dispatch for peak system load used by 
KEPCO for power system planning. 
Korean Power Grid Emergency Networks 
Primary data for the interorganizational blackout management social network was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with Korean electric power industry experts. 14 
expert interviews ranging from 30 minutes to 2 hours in length were held in South Korea over two 
3 month periods in 2014 and 2015. A total of 12.7 hours of interviews were held. Experts 
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interviewed include industry and academic experts from the following organizations: KEPCO, 
KPX, KHNP, NEMA, KMA, Kwater, Seoul National University, and Ulsan National Institute of 
Science and Technology. In these interviews experts provided researchers with 208 pages of 
primary documents outlining various power system emergency protocols that were verified 
among interviewees. These primary documents were coded to determine the specific roles of 
different power system organizations identified in Tables 1 and 2. Additional interviews were then 
held to clarify roles and explicit information sharing and decision-making relationships among 
power grid and emergency management organizations.  
Together, the interviews and coded documents resulted in social network models of the 
formal institutions for blackout management in South Korea, where nodes represent 
organizations in Tables 1 and 2 and links represent bi-directional information sharing and 
decision-making relationships. These networks are detailed representations of real policies and 
protocols to the best of the authors’ knowledge and incorporate additional expert input for their 
accuracy of relationships. 
The shifting context of power grid operations and decision-making changes with power 
system health, defined by system reserve margin, and requires the creation and analysis of six 
blackout management social networks. Six reserve margin thresholds are defined in Korean 
policies, one for normal operations, one for minor events that do not reduce reserve margin past 
set thresholds, and four for increasing blackout risks as backup power becomes less available 
and the system becomes more unstable. We label these thresholds by associated titles denoted 
within the protocols themselves, with increasing risk of blackout from prevention activities to 
Alarm Red. 
 Normal Operations: State/city emergency management agencies coordinate 
infrastructure failure response directly with power infrastructure owners and operators. 
This network applies when infrastructure losses do not affect power grid reserve margin. 
 No Alarm – Prevention: KPX provides blackout coordination to protect the power grid 
and some coordination still exists between state/city  emergency managers and 
infrastructure owner/operators 
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 Alarm Blue – Concern: KPX serves primary blackout coordination role between electric 
power and emergency management industries. Industry-specific regulators like the 
MOTIE provide industry oversight. 
 Alarm Yellow – Caution: Additional oversight ministries involved in coordination efforts 
and first responder decision-making shifts from emergency management agencies to 
city/state governor offices. 
 Alarm Orange – Alert: Crisis coordination and decision-making switches from electric 
power industry organizations to the MOSPA and the NEMA. 
 Alarm Red – Serious: All communication and decision-making between industries 
mediated by Korean Federal Ministries with increasing Ministerial participation (e.g., 
inclusion of military support). 
Network Analysis Methods 
Betweenness of Infrastructure Networks 
The resilience of a power grid must be understood with respect to the service it provides  
[62] – the delivery of electricity from generation to distribution substations that then serve point of 
use. This generation-demand relationship corresponds to social network theory via “package”-
based flow processes [156]. Unlike other social process such as gossip that transfers information 
among actors in an unregulated, probabilistic way, packages are assumed to have explicit 
destinations. Information sharing and decision-making among blackout crisis managers follow a 
similar package delivery relationship due to the regulated nature of the industry.  
The “package delivery” structure and function of the KPG indicates that betweenness, 
which measures the flow contribution of network elements, can be used to identify critical 
components in both infrastructure and social networks. Betweenness in abstract graphs is based 
on the “geodesic path (or shortest path)” from node i to j. The set of all geodesic paths between 
any two nodes i and j is referred to as the “minimum cut set” of i and j. Following this definition, 
the “betweenness” of a node or link (𝐵𝑣) is the total number of geodesic paths the network 
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element v resides on (𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑣 ) normalized by the total number of geodesic paths (𝜎𝑖𝑗) in a network 
[135], following: 
𝐵𝑣 =  ∑
𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑣
𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑖≠𝑣≠𝑗 ∈ 𝑁   (1) 
When used in power grid networks, betweenness identifies critical infrastructure whose loss may 
initiate cascading failures [157]. The same measure in crisis management networks identifies 
authoritative actors that broker emergency information and decision-making rights among 
disconnected groups [143], [145], [158]. Thus, betweenness analysis should identify 
infrastructures that have the greatest influence on power delivery and partnerships that dictate 
crisis coordination activities. 
Additional Power Grid Betweenness Measures 
Bv in Eq. 1 assumes that all links and nodes are equivalent (unweighted and homogeneous), 
which is not true of real power grids. Within the KPG, different characteristic infrastructures 
extract electricity from the network, constraining the total number of origin-destination flow paths 
within the resulting graph. Moreover, power system infrastructure (e.g., power lines) have 
electrical properties that impede and limit electricity from travelling along paths, further 
constraining potential flow. Thus, Eq. 1may produce an unrealistic ranking of critical network 
elements by ignoring relevant power system characteristics.  
In response to the perceived impracticality of Eq. 1 for power grids, researchers have 
developed betweenness measures that include relevant power system data for assessing flow 
contribution. At least two novel electrical betweenness metrics (𝐸𝐵𝑣
1 and 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2) are proposed in 
literature to build upon the formation and purpose of Eq. 1. The method developed by 
Nasiruzzaman et al. [159] combines network science and power system engineering by using 
geodesic paths weighted based on the amount of power flowing through them. 
𝐸𝐵𝑣
1 = ∑
𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑣
𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑖≠𝑣≠𝑗 ∈ 𝑁   (2) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the maximum power flowing in the shortest path between nodes i and j, and 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑣  is the 
maximum of inflow and outflow of power at bus 𝑣 on this shortest path. The feasibility of Eq. 2 for 
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ranking nodes has been studied on numerous IEEE test power systems using both AC [160], 
[161] and DC [159], [162], [163] power flow models. 
Another method developed by Arianos et al. [164]–[166] does not calculate shortest 
paths, and instead uses simplified power grid vulnerability methods [167] and combines their 
output to recreate a measure comparable to betweenness. This method measures the sensitivity 
of nodes and links to the changes in generation and load throughout the system to assess their 
potential contribution to power flow. First, links are considered to be power lines and transformers 
(|𝑳| = 𝑀𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠) and nodes are power system buses organized into three sets: generation (|𝑮| =
𝑁𝐺𝑒𝑛), transmission (|𝑻| = 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠), and distribution (|𝑫| = 𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡). Then, power transfer distribution 
factors [168], 𝑓𝑖
𝑔𝑑
, are calculated for each power line, 𝑙 ∈ 𝑳, for a unit injection of electricity at a 
given generation bus, 𝑔 ∈ 𝑮, and a comparable increase in load at distribution bus, 𝑑 ∈ 𝑫. This 
value is used to determine how the structure of the KPG influences power transmission capacity 
across all 𝑔 to 𝑑 relationships. In addition, it is used to calculate a total transfer capability 
factor, 𝐶𝑔
𝑑, to ensure all power lines remain within maximum power flow limits for each generation-
demand relationship: 
𝐶𝑔
𝑑 = min
𝑙∈𝑳
(
𝑃1
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓1
𝑔𝑑 …
𝑃𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓𝑙
𝑔𝑑 … 
𝑃𝑀
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓𝑀
𝑔𝑑  )  (3) 
 
The bus betweenness of bus v combines these two elements – the sensitivity of power lines 
connected to it and total transfer capability of the grid – and is defined as: 
 
𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 =
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑔
𝑑 ∑ |𝑓𝑙
𝑔𝑑|𝑙∈𝑳𝑣𝑑∈𝑫𝑔∈𝑮 , 𝑔 ≠ 𝑣 ≠ 𝑑  (4) 
 
where 𝑳𝑣 is the set of power lines connected to bus v and the factor of 
1
2
 deals with double 
counting flow into and out of nodes. As 
1
2
𝐶𝑔
𝑑 ∑ |𝑓𝑙
𝑔𝑑|𝑙∈𝑳𝑣  can be interpreted as the security 
constrained contribution to power flow of node v for a single generation – load pair, Eq. 4 
calculates the total power flowing through v relative to all generation – distribution pairs within the 
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system. Thus, Eq. 4 directly measures the contribution of node v to flow without determining 
geodesic paths or minimum cut sets, which is computationally difficult for large networks. The 
feasibility of Eq. 4 for ranking nodes has been studied on numerous IEEE test power systems and 
the Italian high voltage transmission grid [164]–[166], [169], [170]. 
Converting Infrastructure Network Results into Demographic Results 
We use all three betweenness measures to find critical power grid infrastructure in the 
KPG because there is no established “best” option among power grid betweenness measures. 
Then we aggregate results into demographic data useful to blackout management organizations. 
We treat each betweenness score as the relative importance of each power grid bus within the 
KPG characterizing its criticality. Then, we sum normalized scores based on demographic 
information of where each node is located in South Korea (longitude / latitude location) and 
ownership information. These two pieces of information aggregate individual node betweenness 
values into the infrastructure companies that own and operate them (Table 9) and the state or 
special city run emergency management agency (Table 10). 
Additional Social Network Measures 
We use general social network analysis measures outlined below to characterize the six 
blackout management networks and Eq. 1 to identify the critical organizations that broker 
information for blackout coordination. Social network visualization and analysis was completed 
using ORA-LITE social network analysis software [171] developed by the Carnegie Mellon Center 
for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems. 
To compare and contrast blackout management contexts, additional measures are used 
to characterize network-level properties of all six social networks, including [172]: 
 Network Size: the number of organizations (nodes) in each network and the number of 
interactions (links) among organizations. 
 Network Density: Density is calculated as ratio of network interactions to the total 
number of possible interactions. Density is a normalized measure ranging from 0 to 1, 
where 0 indicates an unconnected network and 1 indicates a completely connected 
network.  
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 Network centralization (degree and betweenness): Network centralization measures 
the relative importance of highest ranking node for a single network measure to rest of 
the network. This is expressed as a ratio of the sum of the differences between the 
highest ranking node and the rest of the nodes in the network to the maximum possible 
sum of the differences. Freeman [173] defines standard ways to calculate degree and 
betweenness centralization with the following equations: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 =
∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)
        (5) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  
∑ 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)(𝑛−3)
     (6) 
where 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑖 is the number of links connected to node i (referred to as the degree of i), and 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the degree of the node with the most links. Likewise, 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑖 is the betweenness 
of node i, and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the highest betweenness in the network. All centralization values 
are between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates no centralization (all nodes equal) and 1 
indicates complete centralization (one node dominates the measure).  
 
Results 
Aggregated Power Grid Criticality Results 
Linking the Korean blackout management industry organizations and infrastructure 
criticality analysis results implicates the involvement of different power system and emergency 
management organizations in protecting infrastructure for future blackout events. Table 10 
presents the aggregated and normalized criticality scores for the infrastructures owned by power 
system organizations. All measures implicate KEPCO as owning and operating the majority of 
critical KPG infrastructure. In particular, 𝐵𝑣 and 𝐸𝐵𝑣
1 only identify power generation companies 
owning and operating fractions of a percent of the critical infrastructure. In contrast, 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 identifies 
a much larger participation of power companies in owning and operating critical infrastructure, 
suggesting that KEPCO and KPX only operate ~50% of the critical infrastructure within the KPG. 
The differences between power organizations become more apparent when excluding 
transmission infrastructure and only comparing the critical generation buses. Even though few 
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power plants are identified as critical, it is important to pinpoint these infrastructures to identify the 
importance of generation assets to the KPG. We present the relative importance of just these 
infrastructures to determine which organizations may operate these few, central plants. Here, 𝐵𝑣 
identifies only a single generation company, Korea Midland Power, as owning and operating 
critical infrastructure. 𝐸𝐵𝑣
1 and 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 each identify multiple generation companies, but with varying 
importance of generation technologies. 𝐸𝐵𝑣
1 implicates thermoelectric power companies as more 
important than nuclear, and, in contrast, 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 implicates the exact opposite. Moreover, 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 
produces results quantitatively similar to the percent total installed generation capacity, and is the 
only measure to suggest power producers not affiliated with KEPCO to own and operate critical 
buses.  
Table 10 Criticality of KPG Buses Aggregated by Power Industry Organizations 
 
We combine infrastructure scores for geographic regions to predict which emergency 
management headquarters may be involved in crisis response. Fig. 13 presents the aggregated 
Power Industry 
Organizations
Bv EBv
1
EBv
2
% of Installed 
Gen 
Capacity
Bv EBv
1
EBv
2
KEPCO 100.0% 99.9% 49.9% -- -- -- --
KHNP 0.0% 0.0% 12.7% 29.0% 0.0% 5.6% 25.3%
KOSEPO 0.0% 0.0% 5.4% 9.6% 0.0% 0.0% 10.8%
KOSPO 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 9.6% 0.0% 16.9% 10.1%
EWP 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 10.7% 0.0% 8.5% 13.9%
KOWEPO 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 10.3% 0.0% 22.6% 8.9%
KOMIPO 0.0% 0.1% 6.3% 12.0% 100.0% 46.4% 12.5%
Kwater 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%
Posco Power 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3%
GS Power Co 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%
K-power LTD 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%
Korea District Heating 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5%
Posco E&C LTD 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0%
GS EPS 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2%
Meiya Power Co 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
STX Energy 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Korea Energy Mgmt Corp 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Daelim Mitsubishi 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0%
S-Power 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%
SK Energy 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7%
Hyundai Corp 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Generation OnlyGeneration and Transmission
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infrastructure results including a frequency plot of power generation and transmission 
infrastructure in South Korea compared and normalized criticality scores for infrastructure in each 
state and city region. Although more power system infrastructure is located in the Northwest 
region surrounding the Seoul Metropolitan Area and the Southern coast (Fig. 13A), the measures 
indicate that critical infrastructure may be located elsewhere. Method 𝐵𝑣 suggests that the vast 
majority of critical infrastructure is located in the state Gyeonggi-Do (GGD) surrounding Seoul 
and to a lesser extent the three states making up the center of the country: Chungcheongnam-Do 
(CCND), Chungcheongbuk-Do (CCBD), and Gyeongsangbuk-Do (GSBD), from east to west, 
respectively (Fig. 13B). Method 𝐸𝐵𝑣
1 produces results similar to the physical location of 
infrastructure with greater emphasis on the central and northwest regions of the country instead 
of Seoul and Incheon cities (Fig. 13C). Method 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 suggests that Gyeonggi-Do (GGD) is not the 
most important region, but rather Chungcheongnam-Do (CCND) and Gyeongsangnam-Do 
(GSND), together, contain nearly 50% of all critical infrastructure (Fig. 13D). Across all methods, 
the top ranked infrastructures are more often located in three states of Chungcheongnam-Do 
(CCND), Gyeongsangnam-Do (GSND), and Jeollabuk-Do (JBD). 
Blackout Management Social Network Results 
Fig. 14 presents general results of network analysis for the six blackout management 
social networks. Results show that formal policies produce social networks that have increasing 
organizational inclusion with blackout risk. Formal institutions assume that less risky scenarios 
require less regulated interactions among electric power and emergency management sectors, 
and vulnerable situations with lower reserve margins and greater grid instability require more 
oversight and Federal involvement. This is represented in the network size (Fig. 14A) as the 
number of organizations connected to the network almost doubles from 43 organizations in 
Normal Operations to 79 in Alarm Red. The majority of these new nodes represent either 
emergency managers or federal ministries not involved in minor blackouts, such as governor-
level crisis management HQs and the Ministry of Defense. 
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Figure 13 Aggregate Criticality Scores for Korean Power Grid Infrastructure by Emergency 
Management Region.  
The top left image of Korea presents the amount of generation and substation buses located 
in each region (A), where all other images show the normalized total criticality score for each 
region (B, C, and D). Thus, percent scale refers to quantity of infrastructure (A) and 
aggregated criticality score (B, C, and D). Regions are labelled in (A) with abbreviations: 
Gyeonggi-Do (GGD), Gangwon-Do (GD), Chungcheongnam-Do (CCND), Chungcheongbuk-Do 
(CCBD), Gyeongsangnam-Do (GSND), Gyeongsangbuk-Do (GSBD), Jeollanam-Do (JND), 
Jeollabuk-Do (JBD), Seoul-Si (SS), Incheon-Si (IS), Daejeon-Si (DJS), Gwangju-Si (GS), Daegu-
Si (DGS), Ulsan-Si (US), and Busan-Si (BS). 
GD SS 
IS 
GGD 
CCBD 
CCND 
GSND 
GSBD 
US 
BS 
DGS 
DJS 
JND 
JBD 
GS 
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Figure 14 
Network-Level 
Results for 
Korean Blackout 
Management 
Social Networks.  
We characterize 
the 6 blackout 
management 
social networks 
(y-axes) with five 
characteristic 
network-level 
measures (x-
axes). (A-B) 
Social network 
size is measured 
by the total 
number of 
organizations 
and interactions 
(i.e., links). (C) 
Network density, 
(D) centralization 
of degree, and 
(E) centralization 
of betweenness 
are normalized 
values ranging 
from 0 to 1 (see 
Methods).  
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The decision-making authority of the electric power industry peaks when the first blackout alarm 
is activated (Alarm Blue) and then shifts to the emergency management industry, as represented 
by the number of links (Fig. 14B), network density (Fig. 14C), and centralization of node degree 
(Fig. 14D). All three measures show peaking trends as blackout alarms increase in severity. Even 
though the number of nodes among networks steadily increase with crisis risk level, the number 
of links peak around ~180 links and then decreases to 100 at Alarm Red. This sudden drop in 
links corresponds with the transition of decision-making and information-sharing authority from 
the electric power to the emergency management industry. Moreover, the network density and 
centralization of degree peak at Alarm Blue and decrease across all four alarms, corresponding 
with the initial centralization of authority among the electric power industry and its diffusion into 
emergency management organizations as they join to the network. 
Fig. 14E also demonstrates variability in the centralization of blackout coordination 
activities among sectors with the centralization of betweenness. The centralization of 
betweenness increases across the first four networks, drops to its minimum at Alarm Orange, and 
is at its maximum in Alarm Red. The low centralization of betweenness of Alarm Orange when 
compared to Alarm Yellow or Red corresponds to the electric power and emergency 
management industries sharing information brokerage activities almost equally for that 
interorganizational configuration. All other instances with high centralization of betweenness will 
have a single organization as the most central crisis coordinator. 
 Nodal betweenness identifies that organizations with fewer decision-making roles than 
others tend to broker information during blackouts. Betweenness results presented in Fig. 15 
identify the specific organizations that act as information hubs for blackout response. KEPCO and 
Gyeonggi-Do Fire Mgmt. HQ share central crisis coordination roles for Normal Operations, KPX is 
the most central organization for Prevention, Alarm Blue, and Alarm Yellow, NEMA and KPX 
share coordination for Alarm Orange, and NEMA is the central coordinator for Alarm Red. These 
results correspond to general perspectives held by blackout management experts that either KPX 
or NEMA is the crisis management HQ for blackouts. Still, KPX and NEMA have fewer decision-
making roles as outlined in formal protocols and may not be best suited for being the central 
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information broker. The number of roles assigned to each organization (labelled next to its name) 
reveal that MOTIE (33), KEPCO (19), and MOSPA (19) have far more blackout management 
roles to fulfil than KPX (6) and NEMA (6). This result indicates that decisions made by 
authoritative organizations must travel through intermediary organizations before reaching their 
final destination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Implications for Blackout Management Protocols from the Infrastructure Perspective 
Results suggest that certain generation companies may be more involved in future 
blackout scenarios. Current blackout management policies make limited differentiation between 
organizational roles between generation companies, which may be inappropriate when each 
company owns and operates different amounts of critical infrastructure. For example, both 𝐵𝑣 and 
Figure 15 Betweenness and Number of Roles for Korean Blackout Management 
Organizations.  
Each line represents a different organization. As the majority of organizations are 
periphery actors, they have low betweenness compared to few central, coordinating 
organizations. These central and important organizations are labelled: name (number 
of crisis management roles). Results demonstrate that few organizations from both 
electric power and emergency management sectors are the key crisis coordinator for 
different blackout risks, specifically: KEPCO, KPX, and NEMA. In contrast, MOTIE and 
MOSPA are key decision-making organizations, yet remain periphery to information 
brokerage. 
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𝐸𝐵𝑣
1 would recommend increased protection and recovery capacity be located at generation 
facilities owned and operated by Korea Midland Power, where 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 results emphasize nuclear 
power plants managed by KHNP and relatively equivalent treatment of other KEPCO 
subsidiaries. Moreover, 𝐸𝐵𝑣
2 highlights differences among private power producers that manage 
an appreciable amount of critical infrastructure like SK Energy, Posco Power, and Daelim 
Mitsubishi that are not reflected in crisis management protocols. Based on these results, we 
recommend crisis management policies make more explicit roles for the KEPCO subsidiaries and 
private power companies that operate these critical infrastructures to emphasize their potential 
involvement in blackout response. 
Specific state and city headquarters have a greater chance of being the crisis 
management authority in large-scale blackout support activities than others. Combining results 
across measures, Chungcheongnam-Do (CCND), Gyeongsangnam-Do (GSND), and Jeollabuk-
Do (JBD) house the more critical power grid infrastructure than other regions. Moreover, 
aggregate scores for regions consistently score states higher than cities, with Gyeonggi-Do 
(GGD), Chungcheongnam-Do (CCND), Gyeongsangbuk-Do (GSBD), and Gyeongsangnam-Do 
(GSND) receiving top ranks across multiple methods. Whereas existing national blackout 
management policies treat emergency management HQs equivalently, more focused policies 
may highlight power system protection and response in these regions. For example, the most 
recent blackout in Korea which occurred in the Southeastern region of Gyeongsangnam-Do 
(GSND) was exacerbated as backup infrastructure was only housed in Seoul. Reorienting crisis 
response resources to match these results would have led to a shorter blackout duration by 
maintaining backup transformers near more critical substations. 
Implications for Blackout Management from the Social Network Perspective 
This analysis is the first to take a system-wide perspective on blackout management and 
identify when decision-making and information-sharing authority shifts between industries. 
Policies and protocols outline explicit decision-making and information-sharing roles, and experts 
are aware of the interactions among multiple sectors. However, explicit transitions in authority are 
not outlined in formal institutions making it difficult for actors to predict which electric power or 
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emergency management organization will be the central coordinating body when alarms are 
activated. Network-level analysis demonstrates a transition in authority between the electric 
power and emergency management industries associated with a drop in number of links, network 
density, average degree, and centralization of degree and an increase in centralization of 
betweenness. Decision-making is most centralized in the power industry for Alarm Blue and 
makes a transition to the emergency management industry between Alarms Orange and Red. 
Experts can use this information to determine if current reserve margin and power system stability 
measures are effective for creating the wanted decision-making context to handle blackout risk.  
Betweenness results indicate that there may be a mismatch between blackout decision-
making authority and information brokerage in South Korea, suggesting a need to restructure 
current policies. Although KPX and NEMA are identified as central hubs for power grid and 
emergency management information, they are not the central decision-makers. Having central 
actors be involved in information-sharing is vital for successful blackout response, as effective 
coordination avoids the duplication of work, hindrance of first responders, delays due to 
misunderstanding, and inappropriate allocation of resources [174]. Crises including the 2011 
Seoul Brownout, 2013 Corruption Scandal, 2014 Ferry Tragedy, and 2016 Blackout were 
exacerbated by hindrances like the infeasibility to centrally manage, role ambiguity, and 
unbalanced workload distribution. Restructuring blackout response policies to centralize actors 
with greater decision-making authority may alleviate this issue. MOTIE, in particular, is identified 
through interviews as an important organization for decision-making and oversight, yet remains a 
periphery node within all networks for information brokerage. Making MOTIE a central node is a 
possible way to improve coordination activities. We recommend doing this for intermediary 
networks that transition authority between sectors like Alarm Yellow and Orange as MOTIE has 
equal authority to other Federal organizations where KPX does not. Thus, we recommend that 
future policies restructure policies to centralize MOTIE for Alarms Yellow and Orange to support 
decision-making and shifting authority among industries.  
Combined Guidance 
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Completing infrastructure and interorganizational network analyses side-by-side offers 
combined recommendations to improve blackout management in South Korea. The results from 
both network analysis are complementary as infrastructure analysis identifies which periphery 
organizations own, operate, and respond to critical infrastructure failures and social network 
analysis identifies which organizations coordinate decision-making and information-sharing 
among them. Betweenness results for the social network further indicate that there is a mismatch 
between organizational authority and information brokerage that may require updating protocols 
to restructure the network. While above recommendations for improving formal policies may be 
helpful, they remain superficial by not specifying how improvements are to be made. For 
example, social network analysis can offer the recommendation to restructure the social network 
to centralize MOTIE for Alarms Yellow and Orange, but cannot specify which paths or 
organizations should be involved in restructuring. Instead, the results from infrastructure network 
analysis identifies critical organizations that should be involved in these heightened blackout risk 
scenarios. Our combined recommendation is then to restructure formal institutions to increase 
information flow among the power companies Korea Midland Power, SK Energy, Posco Power, 
and Daelim Mitsubishi the emergency management agencies in Chungcheongnam-Do, 
Gyeongsangnam-Do, and Jeollabuk-Do and MOTIE. 
Conclusion 
Blackouts continue to occur across the globe due to failed blackout coordination 
activities, and power grid resilience depends upon effective formal policies and protocols to 
handle emergency response. We identify critical cases in which blackout coordination does not 
match infrastructure failure needs in South Korea by conducting STNA with matching data from 
2013 for KPG infrastructure and blackout management policies. In the KPG, separate analysis of 
infrastructure and interorganizational networks provide insight into the cause of recent, 
exacerbated events. Power grid criticality analysis shows that some infrastructures and 
organizations may be disproportionately involved in large-scale events, yet formal policies do not 
distinguish between them. Social network analysis characterizes the transition of authority among 
sectors and organizations to help guide more precise use of policies to manage future events. 
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Still, each analysis on its own can only provide broad recommendations for improving institutions 
rather than specific changes to policy. Combined results instead pinpoint the specific social 
networks and organizations that needed to be changed when updating future policies. 
This work demonstrates that the growing number of studies comparing criticality 
measures for other real-world power systems [169], [175]–[177] or developing social networks 
around infrastructure systems [137] would benefit from linking technological analyses to social 
context. Since the majority of academic literature does not bridge infrastructure and social 
contexts, power grid protection and resilience may be undermined by overlooking the social 
consequences of technical recommendations. The inclusion of ownership and jurisdictional 
boundaries in this work revealed Korean organizations whose actions may have greater influence 
on power grid protection than others. In interconnected grids, a similar analysis may highlight 
local decision-makers that have disproportionate authority over power system security that 
crosses utility, state, and country borders. The same is true for social network analysis of actors 
that manage infrastructure systems. Taking a public administration perspective while ignoring the 
interconnected and complex infrastructure system it surrounds may overlook salient interactions 
that connect social entities but exist in the technology. Crisis management protocols made 
without reference to the physical limitations of existing infrastructure creates latent weaknesses 
embedded in policy which may exacerbate damages in future emergencies. The sociotechnical 
network analysis presented herein offers one way to overcome these issues.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ADVANCING CASCADING FAILURE MODELS FOR IMPROVED BLACKOUT MANAGEMENT 
IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
This chapter is in preparation for the journal Nature Energy and appears as is prior to submission. 
The citation for this article is: Eisenberg, D.A., Seager, T.P., Park, J. (2018) Advancing Cascading 
Failure Models for Improved Blackout Management. Nature Energy, in review 
 
Introduction 
One of most important research innovations for measuring cascading failure vulnerability 
in power systems is the cascading failure model [178]–[181]. The 2003 blackout across the US 
and Canada was one of the first well-documented cascading failure events, where small losses 
caused by trees touching power lines, demand imbalances, and out of date operational models 
eventually led to the biggest blackout in North American history [132]. Since 2003, numerous 
large-scale blackouts occurred across the world initiated by diverse events like natural disasters 
and cyber attack [124]. Even with a growing number of documented cascading failure events, 
there is limited information to form a generalizable understanding of cascading failures in power 
grids. Instead, researchers turn to cascading failure models as a means to simulate cascades, 
study different failure mechanisms, and predict expected losses. There are three general types of 
models, each relating power grid vulnerability to a different aspect of power grids: network-based 
models that relate vulnerability to system structure and connectivity, dynamics-based models that 
relate vulnerability to electric power flow redistribution, and component-based models that relate 
vulnerability to joint probabilities and stochastic losses [181], [182]. Prominent models in literature 
include CLM [183], Motter-Lai [184], Oak Ridge–Pserc– Alaska (OPA) [185], [186], Hidden 
Failure [187], the Manchester Model [179], Branching Process [181], and CASCADE [181]. 
Several reviews summarize model development, applications, validation in power grids [178]–
[181], [188]. Taken together, cascading failure models represent an important means to improve 
  84 
power grid resilience by estimating total losses expected when cascades occur and guide 
decision-making by revealing critical infrastructures whose failure may cause cascades. 
With a growing library of tools for predicting and controlling cascading failures, the 
question remains: do these models make people more prepared for cascading failures? In their 
current form, guidance is limited because essentially all studies focus on predicting the 
consequences of cascades without considering the complex decision-making situations during 
cascades. While predating consequences helps identify critical infrastructure components and 
offers solutions to reduce the probability that they fail, it does little to support human response 
when failures eventually happen. Some power grid cascades occur on a sub-second timescale 
faster than humans can respond where these hardening activities are essential. Still, the majority 
of large-scale failures happen on the minute and hour timescales and elicit human response 
[181]. Power grid system operators are not complacent when infrastructure fails, they act 
according to reliability standards and protocols [33]. Common actions taken include remedial 
efforts to adjust power flows, protect vulnerable infrastructures, prepare backup resources, and 
coordinate with relevant owner and regulator organizations. Operators and managers are also 
trained in a number of worst-case scenarios and develop heuristics for managing known 
instabilities within their own systems. Current cascading failure models to do not consider these 
human actions and assume that cascading failure processes are captured entirely by in the built 
components of power grids. In other words, existing cascading failure models assume that 
cascading failure operations are equivalent to normal grid operations. 
However, cascading failures are not normal, and are precisely when current decision-
making practices stretch to their limits. Cascades often occur because power system failures 
originate from risks never experienced before. For example, massive losses caused by a few 
downed power lines touching trees seemed impossible prior to the 2003 North American 
blackout. More recent cascades during Superstorm Sandy [31] and Hurricane Irma [189] have 
little resemblance to the 2003 event, as losses were caused by excessive storm surge and winds 
that stretched the imagination of seasonal weather conditions. This shifting pattern of risk is a 
common factor across many large-scale blackouts, and cascading failure models should be 
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oriented to study what people do during unimaginable events that lack prior knowledge. 
Representing the human-in-the-loop during cascades is important as adaptive human actions are 
often the reason systems are saved or lost during crisis. In best-case scenarios, human actions 
may manage cascades in new and inventive ways never done before. In worst-case scenarios, 
remedial actions taken by grid operators and managers may exacerbate cascading losses 
beyond the scope any failure model would predict. In both situations, it is the adaptive actions 
taken by people that change the outcome cascades, neither of which are considered in existing 
failure models. Thus, cascading failure models should be refocused to inform how grid operators 
and managers extend systems when faced with the unknown, rather than and ignore human 
actions entirely.  
We define extensibility as the way people leverage new information and past experience 
to come up with novel solutions to unforeseen and unknown surprises. Extensibility in power grids 
is not random, it is based on both situational awareness held by infrastructure operators and 
managers as events occur and existing training, guidelines, and partnerships. Improving future 
extensibility requires knowledge of the social context surrounding crisis decision-making 
alongside sociotechnical processes of sensing, anticipating, adapting and learning as crises 
occur. Only very recently are studies trying to embed “humans-in-the-cascading failure-loop” to 
understand how human factors for information collection and use improve or exacerbate losses 
[124]. Still, there is essentially no knowledge of the social context influencing crisis decision-
making when cascades occur, yet a diversity of social factors like utility customer contracts, local 
operational and management practices, economic constraints, regulations, and organizational 
culture influence how decisions are made. 
In this work, we reimagine the purpose of cascading failure models from measuring 
consequences to providing a heuristic way to study extensibility in power grids. Each cascading 
failure model embeds a series of sub-models, including a model to represent the power grid, 
estimate power flow, initiate cascading failures, iterate to measure additional overloads and 
failures, and reach a stopping point. We shift the output of these models from total losses, e.g., 
load shed, to outputs relevant for social context such backup reserve margin, ownership, and the 
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location of losses. This approach links system stress during N-1 failure situations in South Korea 
to a blackout management social network model for interorganizational coordination (Methods). 
The resulting social network is comprised of nodes representing organizations and links 
representing information sharing and coordination partnerships weighted by the frequency and 
intensity of system stress. Taken together, the social network model is an idealized 
representation of the interorganizational coordination context expected in South Korea prior to the 
onset of a large-scale failure and provides a basic structure to understand how organizations may 
extend coordination activities when faced with surprise.  
Generating Cascading Failure Context 
South Korean blackout management involves the coordination of several distinct 
organizational entities to respond to failures, namely infrastructure owners and operators, 
emergency management offices, and federal agencies involved in regulation and coordination 
across sectors. Fig. 16 presents the unweighted social network of partnerships among Korean 
power and emergency management organizations established prior to national emergencies. Fig. 
16 is comprised of 43 companies, including transmission infrastructure owners, major power 
producers each with greater than 10% of national generation capacity, smaller private power 
companies, and state-level emergency management headquarters for organizing first responder 
support to power losses. 
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Results from our cascading failure model show that N-1 failures only involve partnerships 
presented in Fig. 16 because they do not cause significant disruptions in national reserve margin 
(measured as a percentage of available power transfers across the KPG) (Fig. 17). Korean 
blackout management policies use a series of reserve margin thresholds to establish which 
Figure 16 Unweighted 
Social Network for 
Korean Blackout 
Management 
Organizations.  
Infrastructure owners, 
operators, and 
emergency responders 
coordinate to manage 
power grid failures across 
South Korea. Blue links 
represent information 
sharing partnerships that 
link organizations when 
problems occur as 
defined in national 
blackout management 
protocols harmonized 
across the power 
industry. We use this 
social network model as a 
basis for studying 
blackout management 
contexts during 
cascades. Note: Based on 
data from [191]. See Box 1 
for full list of acronyms  
Box 1 List of Acronyms: Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO), Korea Hydro-Nuclear 
Power (KHNP), Korea South East Power (KOSEPO), Korea Southern Power (KOSPO), 
Korea Western Power (KOWEPO), Korea District Heating (KGH), Korea Energy Mgmt. 
Corp (KEMC), Seoul City Fire Disaster HQ (SC-FDHQ), Ulsan City Fire Disaster HQ 
(UC_FDHQ), Busan City Fire Department (BC-FD), Chungcheongbuk-Do Fire Mgmt. HQ 
(CCBD-FMHQ), Chungcheongnam-Do Fire Safety Office (CCND-FSO), Daegu City Fire 
Fighting HQ (DC-FFHQ), Daejeon City Fire Head Office (DC-FHO), East West Power 
(EWP), Gangwon-Do Fire HQ (GD-FHQ), Gwangju City Fire Safety HQ (GC-FSHQ), 
Gyeonggi-Do Fire Disaster HQ (GGD-FDHQ),  Gyeongsangbuk-Do Fire Protection HQ 
(GSBD-FPHQ), Gyeongsangnam-Do Fire Safety HQ (GSND-FSHQ), Incheon City Fire 
Safety Mgmt. Department (IC-FSMD), Jeollabuk-Do Fire Dept. HQ (JBD-FDHQ), 
Jeollanam-Do Fire Service HQ (JND-FSHQ). 
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organizations serve decision-making and coordination roles, and each threshold relates to a 
different social network [33]. The KPG is N-1 reliable, and at no point does any N-1 failure lead to 
the activation of national crisis management thresholds that require the inclusion of organizations 
or partnerships outside of Fig. 16. This is an expected result as power is dispatched to be N-1 
reliable during normal KPG operations.  
N-1 losses do lead to a re-weighting of the social network in Fig. 16 based on which 
organizations are involved after infrastructure is lost (Fig. 17). Our model estimates the 
redistribution of electricity that forces some power infrastructure to be overloaded or near 
overload post failure. In most cascading failure models, these overloaded assets are then 
assumed to fail and cause additional damages. In our model, we assume human action manages 
the additional cascading losses and allow for the system to correct these imbalances. We initially 
weight the “pre-failure” social network based on the amount of infrastructure each organization is 
involved in managing during blackouts and their position within the social network. Then, we use 
the shifting blackout risk during corrective actions to estimate the subset of blackout coordination 
partnerships that would be active prior to additional N-2 or N-3 failures. Each individual model run 
is averaged, and Fig. 17 presents the mean weighting across all links for each phase in the 
propagation of power grid congestion. These weighted social networks estimate the likely 
strength of social ties among organizations by embedding the frequency each partnership is used 
for crisis coordination and the relative system congestion when infrastructure losses occurred. 
Guiding Interorganizational Coordination during Blackouts 
The combination of social and power grid data leads to changes in the link weights that 
reveal salient differences in the importance of each organization for blackout management. These 
differences are captured by the betweenness of each organization (Fig. 18). An organization with 
high betweenness in social network theory is assumed to be a gatekeeper of information by 
brokering indirect connections among power companies and emergency management 
organizations. These gatekeeper organizations act as information sharing hubs, and can support 
coordination across the Korean power industry. 
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Fig. 18 presents normalized unweighted betweenness, 𝐵𝑣, and weighted 
betweenness, 𝐵𝑣
1, for the KPG social network before, during, and after infrastructure failures. Prior 
to a failure, the weighted social network reveals a significant change in the relative importance of 
KEPCO and GGD-FDHQ and a rearrangement of importance among emergency management 
headquarters, e.g., an increase of betweenness of GSBD-FPHQ. During cascades, the 
importance of KEPCO and GGD-FDHQ remains stable, yet the importance of regional crisis 
management hubs shifts to reveal the Northwestern emergency management organization, IC-
FSMD, as more central during stressed power grid states than those in central and southern 
regions (CCND-FSO and JND-FSHQ, respectively). GGD-FDHQ and IC-FSMD coordinate 
response in Gyeonggi-Do and Incheon City, the most populous regions in Korea and surrounding 
Seoul City, suggesting that N-1 losses are most likely to impact the Northwestern Seoul 
Metropolitan Area irrespective of where the infrastructure failures occur. This information would 
be masked without considering the cascading failure context, as the betweenness rank of IC-
FSMD both drops and increases across cascading failure iterations. 
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Figure 17 Cascading Failure Results for South Korea and Associated Weighted Blackout 
Management Social Networks.  
When a single substation or generation bus fails, electricity redistributes across the grid and 
total dispatchable reserve margin changes. The light red region in the above graph 
encompasses all reserve margin gains and losses from N-1 failures in the South Korean power 
grid, where top and bottom dashed lines are the largest gains and losses, respectively. Social 
network links form based on which organization owns and operates stressed infrastructures, 
where stressed infrastructures are located, and how stressed they are (see Methods). The 
weight of each social network link is the mean weight across all N-1 failure scenarios with a 
normalized, maximum partnership strength of 1. Strong and weak partnerships are shown 
across the cascading process as red and blue links, respectively. 
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We use social network analysis to reveal potential ways for organizations can extend 
operations within the current framework of national blackout management policies. 𝐵𝑣
1 results are 
based on strong (frequent) partnerships and represent coordination activities when all 
organizations serve idealized coordination roles. In surprising situations there is no guarantee 
that KEPCO, GGD-FDHQ, or IC-FSMD will fulfill its information sharing activities. Instead, 𝐵𝑣
2 
identifies which organizations have feasible partnerships to be information sharing hubs, yet are 
unlikely to fulfill this role in normal situations because partnerships are weak on average. Results 
presented in Fig. 19 via 𝐵𝑣
2 reveal which organizations that can serve coordination activities in 
parallel to those identified in 𝐵𝑣
1. By focusing on weak ties, 𝐵𝑣
2 offers a heuristic way to determine 
which organizations should relinquish or take on coordination activities during surprising 
Figure 18 Critical Korean organizations for crisis coordination during cascading 
failures. 
Weighted social networks across each N-1 cascading failure iterations lead to shifting 
importance of emergency management organizations to supporting blackout response. 
In particular, IC-FSMD is revealed as a one of the most central organizations for 
corrective blackout response during N-1 operations. The combination of models reveals 
the shifting of blackout risk from central and southern regions to the northeastern 
states that surround Seoul during stressed system states.  
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situations when KEPCO, GGD-FDHQ, and IC-FSMD need additional support. In particular, 𝐵𝑣
2 
suggests that dam and flood control managers (Kwater), emergency management coordinators in 
southern states (GSBD-FPHQ), and power companies (STX Energy and East West Power) can 
support extended, cascading failure situations.  
Discussion 
Combining the structure and function of the KPG with interorganizational demographic 
information and social network data reveals the interorganizational coordination context of the 
Korean power grid during crisis. Cascading failures as surprises, by nature, will be unpredictable 
and will require extensibility by Korean power organizations to fulfill roles they normally would not. 
Still, it is difficult to pinpoint which organizations support extended and surprising situations in 
practice, because large-scale failures are infrequent and blackout management protocols treat all 
power companies and state and city-level emergency management coordinators considered in 
this study equally. Combining a cascading failure model in the power grid with social network 
analysis reveals ways to extend coordination prior to the onset of large-scale, surprising failures. 
Specifically, organizations like KEPCO and IC-FSMD can be supported by extended, parallel 
coordination efforts in Kwater, GSBD-FPHQ, STX Energy, and EWP. Moreover, GGD-FDHQ and 
JND-FSHQ remain central across both 𝐵𝑣
1 and 𝐵𝑣
2 measures suggesting that if either organization 
stopped fulfilling is information sharing role, many parts of the power grid would lack a means to 
coordinate. In both cases, our model reveals the web of complex social relationships that will 
change the course of cascades as they occur. This web should be considered in future, more 
detailed studies that try and predict the total losses expected when failures cascade beyond N-1 
scenarios. 
Our study can advance national emergency management policies in South Korea to 
support new, important ways for organizations to manage blackouts. Several Korean 
infrastructure emergencies demonstrate that centralized emergency management protocols may 
exacerbate problems. For example, the largest Korean brownout in 2011 was exacerbated from a 
contained situation outside of Seoul to a cascading loss of electricity across Seoul because of 
slowed coordination and information sharing activities among power organizations and regulators 
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[33], [146]. Based on our results, the partnerships among specific Korean organizations make 
them more effective at supporting emergency management when coordination breaks down. We 
recommend that additional coordination roles be created among central organizations found 
across social network measures, e.g., creating new coordination partnerships between KEPCO 
and GGD-FDHQ with Kwater and STX Energy.  
 
We feel confident that these minor changes in blackout management protocols will lead 
to significant changes in the management of future blackouts based on similar changes made 
recently in earthquake preparedness. In 2016, earthquake response in Gyeongju, South Korea 
was exacerbated by slowed national response and information sharing to the public [189]. The 
slowed response was caused by strict, hierarchical decision-making processes policies that were 
Figure 19 Critical Korean Organizations that can Serve Crisis Coordination during 
Cascading Failures via Weak Ties.  
Weighted social networks reveal unlikely organizations that are central to serve 
information sharing and coordination roles. In stressed and surprising situations where 
central organizations identified in Fig. 3 fail to fulfill information sharing activities, Kwater, 
GSBD-FDPH, STX Energy, and EWP can support coordinated blackout response. 
Organizations with high ranks in both measures, i.e., GGD-FDHQ and JND-FSHQ, are the 
most critical to the Korean power grid coordination because they will be relevant to 
information sharing in both normal and surprising situations. 
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removed post-event to speed up coordination. The recent 2017 earthquake of similar size and 
velocity near Pohang, South Korea had a much faster response due to these minor policy 
changes. Since our study is identifying similar ways to avoid bottlenecks in blackout management 
coordination, we anticipate that the small changes to national crisis management policies we 
recommend offer a proactive way to ensure better blackout response in the future.  
Conclusion 
Current use of cascading failure models do little to question the existing blackout 
management practices that dictate the real outcomes of surprising infrastructure failures. Outside 
this study, the current use of cascading failure models is as a predictive tool for losses rather than 
a descriptive tool to support blackout management. Ignoring the human factors and social 
contexts that influence crisis decision-making in studies may erode the resilience of global power 
grids by leaving organizations surprised. This study on South Korea finds ways to overcome 
surprise, by showing the shifting importance of Korean organizations during cascades and 
pinpointing organizations that can support information sharing and coordination activities. By 
linking knowledge of social and technological systems together, we overcome limitations of 
current modeling efforts.  
Methods 
Data and Software 
Data is based on a well-studied model of the South Korean power grid (KPG) [33], [150] 
and social network models for Korean power organizations studied in [33]. KPG data was 
provided directly by KEPCO as a PSS/E (power system simulation for engineering) file, and the 
model consists of 2083 power system buses and 4167 power lines and transformer links. All 
power flow analysis was conducted in Matlab with the Matpower package [153] and the GLPK 
optimization solver [190]. Social networks were generated using matlab at analyzed using ORA-
LITE social network analysis software [191]. Data for both models relates to the years of 2013-
2014. Refer to Eisenberg et al. [33] for more detailed descriptions of social network models and 
general metrics characterizing their structure. 
Power Grid Betweenness 
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Betweenness is a generic measure used in both power grid and social network theory to 
identify critical components of systems [156]. The generic form of betweennes that applies to any 
network is based on geodesic paths (or shortest paths) from nodes i to j. The set of all geodesic 
paths between nodes i and j is called the “minimum cut set,” 𝜎𝑖𝑗. The betweenness of any given 
node 𝑣 is then defined as the total number of geodesic paths that node 𝑣 lies on normaled by he 
size of each minimum cut set [192]: 
 
𝐵𝑣 = ∑
𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑣
𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑖≠𝑣≠𝑗                              (1) 
 
Where 𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑣  is the size of the cut set between nodes i and j that node 𝑣 is on, summed over all node 
pairs within a network.  
The generic form of this equation is often inappropriate for power systems. In particular, 
electric power does not flow based on geodesic path, it flows based on power line impedence. To 
address this discrepency, several authors developed power grid specific betweennes measures 
that incorporate measures of power flow. Here, we use the electrical betweenness measure 
developed Arianos et al. [164]–[166] that uses standard measures of  power grid vulnerability to 
determine “electrically between” nodes that influence power flow. To calculate electrical 
betweenness, first the power grid infrastructure is separated into four groups, power lines and 
transformers (|L|=Mlines), buses that produce electricity (|G|=NGen), buses that demand power 
(|D|=NDemand), and transmission buses that direct power flow (|T|=NTrans), where the total number 
of power grid nodes N = NGen + NDemand + NTrans. Then, linear shift factors (also called power 
transfer distribution factors), 𝑓𝑖
𝑔𝑑
, are calculated for each power line, 𝑙 ∈ L, for a unit injection at 
generation bus, 𝑔 ∈ G, and an equal increase in load at demand bus, 𝑑 ∈ D. These linear shift 
factors determine the relationship between KPG structure and shifts in power flow over all power 
lines. The linear shift factors are then used to estimate a total transfer capability for a single 
power line, 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑔
𝑑, by assessing the power transfer for a given g  and d relationship: 
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𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑔
𝑑 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
𝑃1
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓1
𝑔𝑑 , … ,
𝑃𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓𝑙
𝑔𝑑 , … ,
𝑃𝑀
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓𝑀
𝑔𝑑 }             (2) 
 
The electrical betweenness of a given power system bus 𝑣, is then define as: 
 
𝐸𝐵𝑣 =
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑔
𝑑 ∑ |𝑓𝑙
𝑔𝑑|𝑙∈𝑳𝑣𝑑∈𝑫𝑔∈𝑮 , 𝑔 ≠ 𝑣 ≠ 𝑑               (3) 
 
where Lv is the set of power lines attached to bus 𝑣 and the factor of 1/2 accounts for power flow 
into and out of buses. (1 2⁄ ) 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑔
𝑑 ∑ |𝑓𝑙
𝑔𝑑|𝑙∈𝐿𝑣  is interpreted as the security constrained contribution 
of power flow of bus 𝑣 for a single g  and d pair. Thus, (3) measures the contriubtion of each bus 
to power flow without considering geodesic paths.  
Power Grid Cascading Failure Model 
We use (2) and (3) to advance a well-strudied cascading failure model, the Crucitti-
Latora-Marchi (CLM) model [150], [183], [193], [194], to assess shifting congestion wihin electric 
power systems. The CLM model has unique properties that are useful for understanding shifting 
crisis coordination activities during N-1 failures rather than measure the propogation of failures to 
their final cascaded state. The CLM model focuses on understanding how congestion within a 
system is shifted around relative to overloaded nodes. Thus, it is not a cascading failure model 
per se, because it does not depend upon additional failed infrastructure to estimate if overloads 
are occuring. Instead, it focuses on shifting congestion throughout the power grid until a stable 
state is found. The CLM model was originally developed using structural network mesures 𝐵𝑣 and 
link efficiency, 𝑒𝑖𝑗, which is considered the inverse of the distance between two nodes at a given 
time interval, t. Together, these measures are used in a simple algorithm to determine how losses 
within a generic network may cascade across connections. First, the capaity of each node is 
estimated as its inial betweenness at time, 𝐵𝑣(𝑡 = 0), tuned by a capacity parameter, 𝛼: 
 
𝐶𝑣 = 𝐵𝑣(𝑡 = 0) ∗ (1 + 𝛼)      (4) 
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Assuming initial effiency, 𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡 = 0) = 1 𝑑𝑖𝑗(0)⁄ = 1, a node is removed from the network and link 
efficienices are recalcualted with each iteration based on the following equation: 
 
𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = {
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝐶𝑖
𝐵𝑖(𝑡)
,
𝐶𝑗
𝐵𝑗(𝑡)
) ; 𝑖𝑓𝐵𝑖(𝑡) > 𝐶𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑗(𝑡) > 𝐶𝑗
𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡 = 0); 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
        (5) 
 
We build upon this model by for studying congestion-based cascades in power grids 
using the following procedure and substitutions in eqs. 4 and 5. First, we replace 𝐵𝑣 with 𝐸𝐵𝑣. We 
then calcualte eq. 4 assuming the power flow limits found in current KPG data are sufficient 
where 𝛼 = 0. We then relate link efficiency to power line impedence prior to initating cascades. 
For all calculations, we use the DC power flow approxiamtion which simplifies efficiency to be 
power line reactance, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , such that, 𝑥𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑖𝑗(𝑡 = 0) 𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡)⁄ . With the modified version of Eq. 5, 
we remove a single bus from the KPG model and start the CLM cascading procedure [194]. 
These modifcations change the original CLM model from a network-based model assessing 
congestion caused by network connectivity, to a dynamics-based model that assesses 
congestion based on power flow analysis.  
Transmission Reserve Margin Estimation 
Relating cascading failure results to social network generation requires we estimate the 
national reserve margin for South Korea. The reserve margin for the national grid determines the 
crisis management level and resulting organizations involved in blackout response [33]. Reserve 
margin is a function of both the available generation capacity and the capability to transmit this 
electricity to customers. To estimate reserve margin, we first estimate the total transfer capability 
[195]–[197] of the KPG, 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡, summing over all g and d pairs from equation (2), 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑔
𝑑
𝑑(𝑔≠𝑑)∈𝑫𝑔∈𝑮     (6) 
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We then calculate the active transfer capability, 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑡), for each timestep which is 
qualitatively similar to𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡 but also considers active congestion within the power grid estimated 
as active power injections, 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑔
𝑑(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
𝑃1
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃1(𝑡)
𝑓1
𝑔𝑑 , … ,
𝑃𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃𝑙(𝑡)
𝑓𝑙
𝑔𝑑 , … ,
𝑃𝑀
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃𝑀(𝑡)
𝑓𝑀
𝑔𝑑 }      (7) 
𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑡) =
1
𝑁𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑔
𝑑(𝑡)𝑑(𝑔≠𝑑)∈𝑫𝑔∈𝑮     (8) 
 
where 𝑃𝑙(𝑡) is the real power flow over line l at time t. We then estimate the transmission reserve 
margin , 𝑇𝑅𝑀(𝑡), as reductions in available generation due to system congestion that may inhibit 
the dispatch of additional generation resources in Korea. First, we relate reserve margin to 
transfer capability using the standard equation for power system planning [195], [196], 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐶 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶 − 𝑇𝑅𝑀   (9) 
 
and rearrange this equation to relate reductions in generation capacity to system congestion with 
the folowing equations: 
 
𝐴𝐺𝐶 = 𝐼𝐶 − 𝐷      (10) 
𝑈𝐺𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐴𝐺𝐶 (1 −
𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑡)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡
)      (11) 
𝑇𝑅𝑀(𝑡) = 𝐴𝐺𝐶 − 𝑈𝐺𝐶(𝑡)     (12) 
 
where 𝐴𝐺𝐶 is available generation capacity, 𝐼𝐶 is installed generation capacity, 𝐷 is the total 
demand, 𝑈𝐺𝐶(𝑡) is the unavailable generation capacity due to system congestion at cascade 
iteration t (eq. 9-12 are all in units of GW).  
This measure of 𝑇𝑅𝑀 assumes that the dominating factor preventing power dispatch are 
the thermal limits on power lines, which is reasonable for DC power flow, but limited using AC 
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power flow equations. Eq. 6 – 12 also assume that demand, 𝐷, remains constant throughout a 
cascading failure event, which is a common assumption across all cascading failure models 
[178]. 
Social Network Generation and Weighting 
We use the set of nodes (|O|= 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑠 =  𝑁𝑝𝑐 + 𝑁𝑒𝑚) and links (|P|= 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑠) to distinguish 
blackout management social networks from power grid networks. We use the basic network 
structure presented in Fig. 1 and cascading failure model described above to generate sub-
networks for each cascade based on system stress, ownership and locatoin. During each N-1 
cascading failure procedure, we generate a subset of “active” power organzations, 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑠
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∈
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑠, organizations by finding which power grid buses are stressed and likely to cause cascading 
failures if lost. The stress at power system bus v, 𝑆𝑣, is measured by, 
 
𝑆𝑣(𝑡) = {
𝐸𝐵𝑣(𝑡)
𝐸𝐵𝑣(𝑡=0)
, 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐵𝑣(𝑡 = 0) ≤ 𝐸𝐵𝑣(𝑡);
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
       (13) 
 
Each bus at a given cascade iteration t with 𝑆𝑣(𝑡) ≥ 1 is considered “active” and put in set 
𝑁𝑏𝑢𝑠
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∈ (𝑁𝐺𝑒𝑛 ∪ 𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∪ 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠). These active buses are then related to the power industry by 
establishing the subset of power companies that own and operate stressed infrastructure, 
𝑁𝑝𝑐
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∈ 𝑁𝑝𝑐, and the subset of emergency management agencies that will support infrastructure 
response and recovery based on the geographic region stressed infrastructure is located in, 
𝑁𝑒𝑚
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑚. Then, all partnerships among active organizations, 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑠
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∈ 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑠, are added to 
the social network and given equal weight, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1. The final, weighted scocial networks are 
generated by taking the mean of each active link across all N-1 failure scenarios. Thus, all link 
weights are 0 ≤  𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔  ≤ 1, where a partnership with 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔  = 0 means the partnership was never 
relevant to N-1 blackout management, and 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔  = 1 means the partnership was active across all 
failure scenarios. 
Social Network Betweenness 
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The unweighted measure of betweenness, 𝐵𝑣, does not measure organizational 
importance in a weighted social network [192]. Large line weights, 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔~1, in our model means 
strong social ties across partnerships that frequently used for blackout management. Thus, we 
use the inverse weighted betweenness of each organization to determine which is most imporant 
to blackout coordination. This measure, 𝐵𝑣
1has the same mathematical form as 𝐵𝑣, but new cut 
sets for shortest paths between any pair of nodes i and j are found using link distances based on 
weights, 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 1 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔⁄ . We also are interseted in finding all feasible shortest paths througohut 
the social network that are unlikely to be used for blackout management. These paths offer a 
heuristic way to determine which organizations can extend their current operations to support 
blackout coordination. In this case, we use weighted betweenness, 𝐵𝑣
2, which has the same 
mathematical form to 𝐵𝑣, but new cut sets for shortest paths between any pair of nodes i and j are 
Figure 20 Practical Differences among Social Network Betweenness Measures.  
Consider groups 1 and 2 linked by nodes A, B, and C (ignoring group 3). 𝑩𝒗 is a purely 
structural measure, and nodes A, B, and C receive equal values. When measures include 
the link weights shown, 𝑩𝒗
𝟏 denotes node A as the most between and 𝑩𝒗
𝟐 denotes node C as 
the most between. With only two connected groups, 𝑩𝒗
𝟏 and 𝑩𝒗
𝟐 are inverse measures of 
each other. However, in more complex systems where group 3 does exist, 𝑩𝒗
𝟏 and 𝑩𝒗
𝟐 will 
reveal characteristically different information about the social network independent of the 
weight of link C to group 3. In this work, 𝑩𝒗
𝟏 captures optimal information sharing across 
strong ties, where 𝑩𝒗
𝟐 captures least optimal, yet feasible information sharing across weak 
ties. 
  101 
found using link distances based on weights, 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑔
. The practical differences between the 
ouputs of these two weighted betweenness measures for blackout coordination is demonstrated 
in Fig. 20. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation advances a new way to think about resilient infrastructure systems. The 
Majority of existing resilient infrastructure research is based on canonical, yet flawed definitions 
and models of resilience. In an attempt to change the canon, each chapter in this dissertation 
identifies misconceptions about four fundamental building blocks – data, goals, systems, and 
failures – that encourage flawed thinking. The results from each chapter help clarify how to 
overcome each misconception in the following ways:   
 
 Summary of Ch. 2: Thinking that better data analytics will improve resilience 
misunderstands how data analytics serve infrastructure systems. More descriptive, 
predictive, and prescriptive analytics that obviate the need for a molder-in-the-loop or a 
user-in-the-loop can only reinforce existing pre-analytic visions and leave infrastructure 
systems vulnerable to fundamental surprise. Resilience is not gained through a stronger 
commitment to current pre-analytic visions, but through better ways to change visions 
when current models become stale.  
 
 Summary of Ch. 3: Thinking that resilience is a “good” thing that successful systems 
“have” ignores the inherent limitations of resilience strategies. Pursuing a resilience 
strategy like robustness or extensibility is a worthwhile activity only until rigid thresholds 
or decompensation reveal latent, systemic deficiencies to manage surprising events. 
Resilience is neither robustness nor extensibility, but a capacity to switch between them 
to match given stress conditions. This fact is problematic in a world of limited resources, 
where a commitment to any single strategy potentially means the rejection of another. In 
an uncertain future, the robust and extensible infrastructure systems built today will resile 
between strategies not because they want to, but because they must.  
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 Summary of Ch. 4: Thinking that resilience is improved via technological solutions that 
reduce the probability of losses ignores the sociotechnical nature of infrastructure 
systems. First, researchers take for granted that the network model they are using to 
study an infrastructure system is ground truth, when conflicting system models exist that 
change results and recommendations. Developing more nuanced decisions that integrate 
conflicting models overcomes probabilistic thinking on failure likelihood with possibilisitic, 
“what-if” thinking necessary for resilience. Furthermore, possibilisitic perspectives on 
technological models in isolation only offer limited recommendations to the human 
actions that dictate failure consequences. Expanding analysis to include both 
technological and social models offers explicit recommendations for infrastructure crisis 
response that neither approach could offer on its own. 
 
 Summary of Ch. 5: Thinking that infrastructure losses can be estimated via cascading 
failure models also ignores the sociotechnical nature of infrastructure failures. The 
amount of damages that infrastructure endures during surprise is dictated by human 
actions during cascading failures. Assuming normal operations during surprises 
overlooks the shifting social contexts that eventually dictate coordination activities, 
human response, and failure consequences. By focusing on the social context of 
cascading failures while they happen, new recommendations for emergency coordination 
can be developed that would otherwise be overlooked. 
 
Through the clarification of how data, goals, systems, and failures influence resilience 
research, this dissertation advances new ways to think about three of the SAAL processes of 
sensing, adapting, and anticipating (Fig. 18). Based on the simple control loop model presented 
in the Introduction (see Ch. 1, Fig. 2), system models developed by researchers for to study 
resilience embed sensing, adapting, and anticipating processes. Current resilience thinking tends 
to produce research that only considers sensing via analytic models, adapting via robustness, 
and anticipating via engineering. Based on this dissertation, sensing processes are expanded to 
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consider human-in-the-loop to reveal latent issues with analytic designs and overcome stale 
models with imaginative new descriptions, predictions, and prescriptions of infrastructure 
systems. New approaches to sensing enable contextual information regarding the beliefs and 
training of users to be shared with modelers and guide decision-making in unforeseen and 
unknown futures. Adapting processes are expanded to include both robustness and extensibility 
strategies for managing unforeseen and unknown failures. Clarification for when one strategy is 
preferred over another depends on how benefits and drawbacks match stress conditions.  
 
 
Figure 18 Dissertation contribution to SAAL Processes. 
This dissertation expands current notions of the three processes that comprise the 
system model portion of the SAAL framework (refer to Ch.1, Fig. 2). Prevalent 
understandings of SAAL processes only consider sensing with analytics, adapting 
with robustness, and anticipating via technological models. This dissertation 
presents new, competing options for performing these processes: sensing via 
analytic models and modelers, adapting via robustness and extensibility strategies, 
and anticipating via people-centered systems and failure models.  
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Finally, anticipating processes for systems and failures are expanded from a technology-
centric perspective to a sociotechnical perspective. Unlike sensing and adapting processes, 
advancing anticipating processes requires the act of anticipating itself by discovering the biases 
and beliefs embedded in specific models for a critical infrastructure system. Interrogating models 
and their embedded biases is necessary, because each infrastructure system has a characteristic 
architecture [198]–[201] that is has both generalizable and idiosyncratic elements. Complexity in 
infrastructure systems arises from the need to represent system architecture with a simplified 
model to understand infrastructure structure and function [84], [202], [203]. Since no single model 
is capable of including all embedded characteristics of infrastructure systems, anticipating design 
and management of infrastructure failures from multiple perspectives helps reveal embedded 
biases and can produce mutually beneficial results that resolve issues of complexity. This 
dissertation work advances anticipating processes specifically for electric power systems by 
studying the South Korean power grid using established network science measures of 
betweenness. Both engineering and social science literature use different models when applying 
betweenness measures to emphasize some aspects of power systems over others. The majority 
of this work focused on interpreting the results from engineering network models with social 
science solutions, and vice versa. Together, this dissertation advances anticipating processes by 
considering the structure of social systems dictate infrastructure failure response and expanding 
probabilistic thinking about failure likelihood to possibilisitic thinking about what will be done when 
failures occur. Likewise, technological anticipation emphasizes what initiates failures and the total 
losses, where a human perspective anticipates the actions taken during events.  
This new understanding of the SAAL processes is significant for resilient 
infrastructure systems writ large because it advances a way to think about resilience as a 
verb. Overall, this dissertation centers on what resilience means when treated as a verb. Results 
from all chapters indicate that risk-based thinking focuses on the properties or objects that 
systems have, rather than the actions systems do. This is why risk lends itself to quantifiable 
measures where attempts to measure resilience remain conceptual or impracticable. This is 
because resilience is not like risk – resilience is not a property an infrastructure system has, it is 
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an action an infrastructure system does. This way of thinking about resilience is the foundation of 
this dissertation. 
Treating resilience as a verb means the future of resilience research may look very 
different than the current literature. Resilience as a verb means resilient infrastructure research 
should examine of ways infrastructure systems take action to manage surprising events. By 
revealing misconceptions about data, goals, systems, and failures, each chapter in this 
dissertation reveals multiple ways to perform SAAL. Each way, e.g., robustness or extensibility, 
brings with it different benefits and drawbacks that must be managed. Associated resilience 
analyses would then examine how infrastructure systems perform the SAAL processes and 
measure how difficult it would be to change current strategies to meet a new stress context. A 
resilient system is one that has the capability to match sensing, adapting, and anticipating 
processes to surprise. 
In conclusion, there is now a new way to think about resilience that may bring radical 
changes to the future development of a resilience theory. Where current definitions and models 
fail to change risk-based failure management practices, this new way of thinking rejects the 
current canon for one unavailable in the literature. For example, the National Academies of 
Science definition of resilience as, “the ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and 
adapt to adverse events,” would be discarded for verb forms of resilience such as: 
to resile (verb): to adjust current models to meet surprising stress 
conditions. 
New, provocative models will also replace the critical functionality curve to shift from the 
retrospective measures of system damages to the prospective measures of system processes.  
Whether or not this way to think about resilience is correct, it is important because 
it has the power to change the failure management paradigm away from risk. Disasters 
today and into the future will continue to remind society that risk-based thinking does not protect 
infrastructures from crisis. Hopefully, with the change put forth in this work, infrastructure systems 
and the people that depend on them will be better at managing future disasters. 
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